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COPYRIGHT AND THE VAGUENESS DOCTRINEt
Bradley E. Abruzzi*
The Constitution's void-for-vagueness doctrine is itself vaguely stated. The doc-
trine does little to describe at what point vague laws-other than those that are
entirely standardless-become unconstitutionally vague. Rather than explore this
territory, the Supreme Court has identified three collateral factors that affect its in-
clination to invalidate a law for vagueness: (1) whether the law burdens the
exercise of constitutional rights, (2) whether the law is punitive in nature, and (3)
whether the law overlays a defendant-protective scienter requirement. Measured
against these factors, copyright law does not meet the vagueness doctrine's mini-
mum requirement offair notice to the public. Copyright, by its terms, restricts free
speech, and the law's prolixity frustrates ex ante assessment of what speech is law-
fJd. In addition, substantial similarity and fair use, the very provisions of
copyright law that are generally held to rescue it from overbreadth, themselves ad-
mit considerable uncertainty into the infringement analysis. That substantial,
extracompensatory damages are available against infringers, regardless of their
state of mind, renders the copyright laws still more problematic under the vague-
ness doctrine. This Article argues that although a case can be made that the
copyright laws are unconstitutionally vague, invalidation of all or any portion of
the Copyright Act is unlikely and not constructive. Reforms undertaken specifical-
ly to cure copyright's indeterminacy are not likely to be effective, either However a
consideration of the vagueness doctrine's collateral factors and how they apply to
copyright suggests an appropriate reform of the law. For cases involving expressive
use of copyrighted content, lawmakers should adopt a three-tiered system of civil in-
fringement liability by which strict liability is preserved in cases brought for
injunctive relief only, while suits for statutory and actual damages require proof of
willful and negligent infringement, respectively.
INTRODUCTION
Much ink has been spilled over the years on the question of
copyright's constitutionality as a speech restriction.' Writing most
t Copyright @ 2011 Bradley E. Abruzzi
Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I
owe special thanks to David Abrams, David Ardia, David Fagundes, John Goldberg, and
Lloyd Weinreb for their helpful comments and critiques of an early draft. Thanks as well to
those who asked searching and thought-provoking questions when I presented this paper at
the Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property Colloquium at Boston University and the Har-
vard-MIT-Yale Cyberscholar Working Group session in February 2011.
1. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112
YALE L.J. 1, 14 (2002); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1057
(2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN.
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recently on the subject in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court
pronounced itself satisfied that the copyright infringement action
does not effect an unconstitutional regulation of protected speech,
so long as Congress does not alter the "traditional contours of cop-
yright protection."' The Eldred Court drew its confidence from the
"4Copyright Act's "built-in First Amendment accommodations -
namely, the affirmative defense of fair use and the distinction that
the law draws between expression, which is properly the subject of
copyright protection, and ideas, which are not. Eldred's logic trig-
gered a burst of renewed interest from the scholarly commentariat,
all of it given over to a critical examination of the Court's sugges-
tion that these two core copyright doctrines, fair use and the
"idea/expression dichotomy," as the Court has described it,5 rescue
the law from any claim of First Amendment overbreadth." Absent,
however, from both the case law and the critical literature is any
attention to whether the line marked off between lawful and in-
fringing expression-a line that fair use and idea-expression do
substantial constitutional work policing-is drawn clearly enough
to rebuff a challenge that copyright is unconstitutionally vague.
It should go without saying that copyright law is "vague," at least
in layman's terms. The simple, first-order question of whether a
given instance of speech infringes another's copyright gives rise to
multiple subsidiary legal questions, many of them interrelated, and
all of them potentially dispositive of an infringement claim. The
Supreme Court's void-for-vagueness doctrine commands a greater
degree of specificity'-and simplicity8-from speech restrictions.
Nowhere else does the law present a speech regulation remotely as
complex or prolix as the copyright infringement action.
L. REv. 1, 48 (2001); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees
ofFree Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180, 1181 (1970).
2. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
3. Id. at 221.
4. Id. at 219 (citing Harper & Row Publ'rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560
(1985)).
5. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556.
6. See, e.g., Christina Bohannan, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech, 61 HAS-
TINGs L.J. 1083 (2010); David S. Olson, First Amendment Interests and Copyright Accommodations,
50 B.C. L. REv. 1393 (2009); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms
Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004); Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright
Law and Free Speech after Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 1275 (2003); Richard Posner,
The Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act: Economics, Politics, Law, and Judicial
Technique in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 55 Sup. CT. REV. 143, 158-61 (2003).
7. See, e.g., Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
498 (1982); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
8. See infra Part I.B. (discussing the Supreme Court's recent rulings in Citizens United
v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), and Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007)).
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It only compounds the problem that the two rescue doctrines
identified by the Eldred Court are themselves fraught with indeter-
minacy. One cannot dispute that the "idea/expression dichotomy"'
and its effectuation in copyright's familiar substantial similarity test
for infringemento are necessarily vaguely stated, ex ante. Judge
Learned Hand wrote:
The test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague.
In the case of verbal "works" it is well settled that although the
"proprietor's" monopoly extends beyond an exact reproduc-
tion of the words, there can be no copyright in the "ideas"
disclosed but only in their "expression." Obviously, no princi-
ple can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond
copying the "idea," and has borrowed its "expression." Deci-
sions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc."
The defense of fair use is also poorly sketched out in the copy-
right statutes. Instead, it has been left to the courts to elaborate in
case-specific applications, and the cases ultimately offer little guid-
ance to speakers. Indeed, we often celebrate fair use for its
flexibility and open-ended character. But the vagueness in the sub-
stantial similarity test and the fair use defense has significant
implications for speakers. These are not obscure details relegated
to the Copyright Act's cobwebby corners-they are bedrock copy-
right principles. Taking the Court at its word, substantial similarity
and the fair use defense may ensure that copyright does not pro-
scribe or punish protected speech. Yet, to accomplish these results,
they probably cannot be written with greater precision or give
more advance notice to speakers. 2
Thus, copyright presents a singularly complex and convoluted
regulatory scheme, and the First Amendment rescue doctrines are
themselves fraught with uncertainty. It remains to consider wheth-
er copyright is vague as a constitutional matter. As a practical
matter, this Article does not propose that any court should (or will)
invoke the void-for-vagueness doctrine to invalidate the Copyright
9. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556.
10. See Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 675-76 (1878) ("It follows that to infringe
[copy] right a substantial copy of the whole or of a material part must be produced."); Castle
Rock Entm't v. Carol Publ'g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1998) (reciting that a plaintiff
must prove that "copying was improper or unlawful by showing that the second work bears
'substantial similarity' to [the plaintiffs] protected expression" (quoting Repp v. Webber,
132 F.3d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1997))).
11. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
12. See infra Part III.B.
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Act. 3 Rather, this Article argues that copyright's uncertainty raises
significant due process and First Amendment concerns for speak-
ers, and reference to the vagueness doctrine supplies a useful
approach to alleviating these concerns. A review of the Supreme
Court's vagueness jurisprudence and application of its principles to
the Copyright Act points the way to positive reforms of the law that
will fortify the copyright infringement action against constitutional
vagueness challenge and, more importantly, mitigate copyright's
ongoing chilling effect on speech.
Part I of this Article explores the void-for-vagueness doctrine and
identifies "collateral factors" that, while not specifically relating to
a law's vagueness, are nonetheless material to, and often dispositive
of, a constitutional vagueness challenge. These collateral factors
relate to whether a law regulates expression, imposes criminal
penalties, and incorporates mens rea or scienter requirements. This
Part also discusses the recent attention the Supreme Court has
given to the vagueness issues presented by case-by-case or factor-
intensive review of expression, issues that are especially relevant to
the copyright infringement action. Part II discusses copyright's sus-
ceptibility to a vagueness challenge, with specific attention to the
doctrines of idea-expression, substantial similarity, and fair use.
This Part concludes that copyright does not provide adequate ex
ante notice of what expression rises to the level of infringement.
Moreover, upon application of the collateral factors to the in-
fringement action, copyright emerges as the sort of law from which
the vagueness doctrine commands a high level of written precision.
Part III considers how best to resolve this constitutional problem
and ultimately concludes that copyright should adopt a three-tier
remedy structure for civil infringement claims involving expressive
uses of protected content. Strict liability would remain an appropri-
ate basis for granting injunctive relief, but a plaintiff could not
obtain damages without first demonstrating that the defendant act-
ed negligently in infringing his or copyright, and an election of
statutory damages would require a further showing of willfulness
on the defendant's part. The Copyright Act's present damages
structure would remain in effect when a court has determined that
the alleged infringement is not expressive in nature.
13. See infra Section III.A. One court has decided a vagueness challenge to copyright,
and it ruled against the challenger. See Aharonian v. Gonzales, No. C04-5190, 2006 WL
13067, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2006) (declining to enter a declaratory judgment that would
hold copyright law unconstitutionally vague as applied to computer code).
354 [VOL. 45:2
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I. THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE, EXAMINED
A. "Hallmarks" of Vague Laws
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is, at its root, a matter of due
process. The notion that courts might invalidate criminal laws that
do not adequately parse permissible from prohibited conduct is
uncontroversial.14 The Supreme Court has written:
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must
be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it
what conduct on their part will render them liable to its pen-
alties, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with
ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law. And
a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act
in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must nec-
essarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law."
Vague laws offend the Due Process Clause when they give inade-
quate or defective notice of what is forbidden and therefore "may
trap the innocent by not providing fair warning." 6
Unconstitutionally vague laws also do not meet the requirement
"that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law en-
forcement."" The Supreme Court regards this characteristic of a
vague law as more consequential than the failure of notice.'1 A
vague law delegates an excess of interpretative and enforcement
authority to prosecutors, police, and judges,19 and this in turn rais-
es the prospect of arbitrary or selective enforcement.20 Courts have
expressed concern that a vaguely written law will create an inordi-
nately large class of violators, such that state actors charged with
enforcing the law must single out certain offenders above others
14. See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (citing Int'l Harvester
Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914); Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 (1914)).
15. Id.
16. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); see also City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58 (1999) ("No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property
to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes." (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451, 453 (1939) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
17. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566, 574 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. See id. (citing Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574).
19. See Wright v. NewJersey, 469 U.S. 1146, 1148-49 (1985) (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S.
at 108-09) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV.
235, 261 n.96 (1994) (citing Kolender 461 U.S. at 357-58).
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for prosecution . Considerations ancillary to the nature and severi-
ty of the offense-and possibly improper considerations-can leak
into these judgments. 22 Indeed, a vague law will also invest the judi-
ciary with an excess of discretion in applying the law.
Finally, a law is unconstitutionally vague if "[u]ncertain mean-
ings inevitably lead citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful
zone . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly
marked." Like any other law, a vaguely written law leaves the indi-
vidual at his or her liberty to engage in the conduct it does not
proscribe. However, when a risk-averse individual cannot confi-
dently discern what is and is not permitted, he or she may well
abandon certain conduct that a court, interpreting the law authori-
tatively but after the fact, would find lawful. Although the law
would not punish in this case, the threat of these consequences, or
even the threat of legal proceedings, constrains action and thereby
infringes on individual liberty. This incursion on liberty is particu-
larly insidious because it eludes review by the courts, which have no
occasion to pass on the correctness of a risk-averse response to the
law. It is for this reason that courts allow facial challenges to vague
laws that implicate constitutional rights: the subject of an enforce-
ment action in effect sues on behalf of the chilled speakers who
themselves avoided controversy at the expense of exercising pro-
tected freedoms."
21. See, e.g., Kolender, 461 U.S. at 360; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
22. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); see also Kolender, 461
U.S. at 360 (faulting a statute as unconstitutionally vague in part because it devolved "law-
making to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat" and thereby
supplied "a convenient tool for harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting
officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure" (quoting Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170
(1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
23. Interestingly, the Supreme Court's concerns about a vague law's delegation of au-
thority to courts relate more to the separation of powers than to any suggestion that judges
are susceptible to the sort of bias and other human failings that plague police and prosecu-
tors. Compare United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875) (suggesting that a law that
"leave[s] it to the courts to ... say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set
at large" is "dangerous" because it "would . . . substitute the judicial for the legislative de-
partment of the government."), with, e.g., Goguen, 415 U.S. at 575 (finding a flag contempt
statute to be of "such a standardless sweep" as to "allow[] policemen, prosecutors, and juries
to pursue their personal predilections").
24. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09 (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964))
(internal quotation marks omitted). This rationale might at first appear inconsistent with
the Court's earlier-expressed concern that vague laws will "trap the innocent," id. at 108-or
at least rooted in a diametrically opposed view of human nature-but of course there is no
irreconcilable contradiction embedded in the notion that a poorly written law might affect
risk-seeking and risk-averse persons differently, but adversely all the same.
25. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195-96 n.4 (1976); Robert Post, The Constituiional
Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 28 (2000); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Norma-
Copyright and the Vagueness Doctrine
B. The Vagueness Doctrine and "Prolix Laws"
An emerging aspect of vagueness review merits special mention.
In its recent campaign finance reform decisions, Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission2 6 and Federal Election Commission v. Wiscon-
sin Right to Life, Inc.," the Supreme Court has looked askance at
political speech restrictions that incorporate factor-intensive legal
standards or otherwise call for case-by-case adjudication. In reject-
ing a "saving" interpretation of the federal statutory restriction on
certain "electioneering communications," the Citizens United Court
placed considerable emphasis on the transaction costs of obtaining
clarity of compliance." The proposed interpretation was an
"amorphous regulatory interpretation," the Court held, and it in-
troduced unacceptable "costs and burdens of litigation" in
addition to exposure to a risk of criminal sanctions under the stat-
ute.2 9 The Court wrote: "The First Amendment does not permit
laws that force speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney,
conduct demographic marketing research, or seek declaratory rul-
ings before discussing the most salient political issues of our day.""o
In the Court's view, complex fact- and factor-intensive laws ulti-
mately burden speech in much the same as a standardless law
might. "Prolix laws chill speech for the same reason that vague laws
chill speech: People 'of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at [the law's] meaning and differ as to its application."' 0
The Citizens United Court rejected another statute-saving interpre-
tation on the ground that it, too, would invite "intricate case-by-case
determinations to verify whether political speech is banned," and
"archetypical political speech would be chilled in the meantime." 2
Finally, the Court noted that the statute's provision for issuance of
advisory opinions to political speakers in effect operated as a prior
restraint:
tive and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1816
(1997).
26. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
27. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
28. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 889.
29. Id.; cf Polygram Holding, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 416 F.3d 29, 34 (D.C. Cir.
2005) ("'Litigation costs are the product of vague rules combined with high stakes, and
nowhere is that combination more deadly than in antitrust litigation under the Rule of Rea-
son.'" (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 12-13
(1984))).
30. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 889.
31. Id. (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
32. Id. at 892.
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When the FEC issues advisory opinions that prohibit speech,
"[m]any persons, rather than undertake the considerable
burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights
through case-by-case litigation, will choose simply to abstain
from protected speech-harming not only themselves but so-
ciety as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas."
The Court's language in Citizens United is significant for its recogni-
tion that legal standards calling for case-by-case adjudication of the
legality of speech are themselves constitutionally problematic, at
least in the context of political expression.
The Court's insights in Citizens United elaborated its recent pro-
nouncement, in Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL), that a speech
restriction "must eschew 'the open-ended rough-and-tumble of fac-
tors,' which 'invit[es] complex argument in a trial court and a
virtually inevitable appeal.' " Applying WRTL to a speech regula-
tion, the applicability of which turned on how a "reasonable
person" would receive a communication "in light of four 'contex-
tual factors,"' the Fourth Circuit recently wrote: "This sort of ad
hoc, totality of the circumstances-based approach provides neither
fair warning to speakers that their speech will be regulated nor suf-
ficient direction to regulators as to what constitutes political
speech." It is important to note, too, that the Citizens United/WRTL
problem adheres whether or not a court would ultimately hold that
the expression in question did not violate the law.
The Court in Citizens United treats "prolix" laws as conceptually
distinct from "vague" laws, presumably on the ground that a pro-
lix law confounds the populace with its complexity, whereas, strictly
speaking, it is the very lack of elaboration in a vague law that is
confounding. But this distinction is ultimately immaterial, from a
constitutional standpoint. As the Court observes, whatever the
cause of uncertainty, its effect is the same: it chills speech.8 Moreo-
ver, a prolix law carries all the hallmarks of a classically vague law.
33. Id. at 896 (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)).
34. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007) (quot-
ingJerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 547 (1995)).
35. North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake,.525 F.3d 274, 283 (4th Cir. 2008).
36. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) ("Even the prospect of ultimate
failure of such prosecutions by no means dispels their chilling effect on protected expres-
sion."); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1837 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Dombrowski 380 U.S. at 494).
37. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 889 (2010).
38. See id.
39. See supra Section I.A.
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Accordingly, this Article proposes to treat "prolixity" of the sort the
Court critiqued in Citizens United as a species of vagueness.0
The law is, of course, thick with conditions under which legal
liability may attach based on the application of fact- and factor-
intensive standards,4' but to this point the Supreme Court's emerg-
ing vague-by-prolixity doctrine is confined to laws that burden
speech-and political speech, at that. This approach is consistent
with classical vagueness jurisprudence, which has tended to cluster
around speech cases, given the Court's view that the doctrine bears
more heavily when an indefinite law burdens the exercise of consti-
tutional rights." Even if the Court ultimately elects not to export
this line of jurisprudence outside the First Amendment setting, the
indications given in Citizens United and WRTL of the overly compli-
cated or "prolix" law as a new species of constitutionally
problematic vagueness-or at least a cognate of the standardless
law-are still significant for speech regulations generally and, as
explained below, for copyright specifically.
C. How Vague Is "Unconstitutionally Vague"?
To some extent, all laws are vague. Language is, by its nature,
imprecise, and therefore always subject to down-the-line interpreta-
tion.4 3 Any suggestion of a law presumes the formulation ex ante of
a general rule; the post hoc exercise of reviewing specific conduct
against the rule necessarily admits uncertainty. These might seem
to be merely theoretical objections. After all, if lawmakers take due
care in crafting statutory language, they may well ensure that a law
applies uncontroversially to a "core" of proscribed conduct that is
their target." Although the law may reach potential applications
40. SeeKeyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) ("Vagueness of wording is
aggravated by prolixity and profusion of statutes, regulations, and administrative machinery,
and by manifold cross-references to interrelated enactments and rules.").
41. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2) (A) (2006) (four-factor test for "famous mark" status
in trademark dilution cases); Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269
F.3d 270, 280-81 (3d Cir. 2001) (ten-factor test for proof of trademark infringement by
likelihood of confusion); Burlarley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 904 N.Y.S.2d 826, 827 (App. Div.
2010) (five-factor test for respondeat superior liability in tort cases).
42. See infra Section I.D.1.
43. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) ("Condemned to
the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.").
44. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 577-78 (1974) ("To be sure, there are
statutes that by their terms or as authoritatively construed apply without question to certain
activities, but whose application to other behavior is uncertain."); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733, 755-56 (1974) (quoting Goguen and holding that the defendant, whose conduct was
core conduct clearly in violation of the statute, lacked standing to mount a facial void-for-
vagueness challenge).
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that are unanticipated or incidental to lawmakers' intentions, to
reject any law on the ground that its applicability is vague at the
margins would throw the baby out with the bathwater.
By necessity, then, the Constitution must tolerate some level of
vagueness in the law. It remains the unenviable task of the courts to
decide at what point a law's prescriptions are so imprecise as to be
unconstitutionally vague. Application of the vagueness doctrine, at
its heart, turns on a question of degree: granting the objection that
any law admits at least some uncertainty, how much uncertainty
should the Constitution tolerate? The Supreme Court offers little
guidance on this question. The Justices' discussion over the years
of what it means to be unconstitutionally vague has been for the
most part unhelpful. The rendered and repeated language on
vagueness consists almost entirely of descriptions of the "aspects" or
"hallmarks" of vagueness discussed above: notice failure, over-
delegation of authority to law enforcement, and the chilling of
potentially lawful conduct. These do not so much describe elements
of a legal standard as they elaborate the objectionable qualities of a
vague law. Again, every law admits some degree of uncertainty, and
it follows that every law fails to some extent to give notice to the
public, gives some measure of free rein to law enforcement, and
will place a degree of fact-checking doubt in the mind of the risk-
averse individual. The question of degree recurs: how much notice
failure, free rein, or chilled conduct is constitutionally acceptable?
Given the state of the Court's jurisprudence, one could even ar-
gue that the void-for-vagueness doctrine is itself standardless,
vague, and susceptible to arbitrary or selective application by the
courts. To the extent any test for unconstitutional vagueness exists,
it was given in Connally v. General Construction Co." by Justice Suth-
erland: "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must nec-
essarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates
the first essential of due process of law."4 Laws must not be merely
vague, then, but "so vague that men of common intelligence" are
flummoxed or will at least disagree on questions of the law's appli-
cation. Justice Sutherland's oft-quoted rendition of the doctrine
seems to supply a useful differentiation between the plain old
vague law and one that offends due process. But there remains a
great deal of room for disagreement even within the Connally for-
45. See Aharonian v. Gonzales, No. C04-5190, 2006 WL 13067, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3,
2006) (emphasizing the distinction between "somewhat vague" and "unconstitutionally
vague" or "fatally vague").
46. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
47. Id. at 391.
360 [VOL. 45:2
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mulation. Perhaps in order to avoid wading into this gray area,
courts have incorporated into the vagueness analysis three collat-
eral factors-each entirely collateral to the indeterminacy of a
given law-that, once reviewed, do much of the work of tipping a
law to one side or the other of the constitutional fence.
D. "Collateral Factors" That Affect Void-for-Vagueness Detenninations
Although the Supreme Court has largely failed to fashion a use-
ful and predictive legal standard for vagueness cases, the case law
does describe circumstances that call for more searching judicial
review of laws that draw uncertain boundaries. These circumstanc-
es, or "collateral factors," often prove decisive of the question
whether a vague law violates the Constitution. This is principally
because these collateral factors disclose how much a law's uncer-
tainty constrains public liberty. Collateral factors may also be
dispositive both because they are easy to assess and because they
allow courts to opt out of answering the "how vague is too vague?'
question. That is, the collateral factors take the otherwise airy art
of assessing a law's vagueness and render it more grounded and
scientific.
Case law identifies three collateral factors that courts use in as-
sessing the vagueness of a particular law. First, courts inquire
whether the law impairs the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights. Second, courts consider the extent to which the law deters
lawful conduct; thus, a law that is enforced criminally or carries
heavy civil penalties must be written with greater precision than a
civil law that imposes a modest fine or compensates a private party
for actual damages. Third, a law that does not incorporate a scienter
or mens rea requirement is more susceptible to a void-for-vagueness
determination.
1. Does the Law Restrict the Exercise of
Constitutionally Protected Rights?
The first, and "perhaps the most important[,] factor affecting
the clarity that the Constitution demands of a law is whether it
threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights."08 A law that might reach protected rights will be subjected
48. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499
(1982); Women's Med. Prof I Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 197 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499); see also Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 681 (1972)
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to greater scrutiny than a "purely economic regulation." Vague
laws that affect, inter alia, abortion5o and free speech5 ' rights fall in-
to the category of laws from which the Constitution requires
greater definition and precision.
A vague content-based speech regulation "raises special First
Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free
speech",2 and must therefore be subject to "a more stringent vague-
ness test."" "Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing
space to survive," the Supreme Court has written, "government may
regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." , 4 This does not
mean that governments must write speech-incident laws with perfect
precision, or that anything short of airtight notice to a speaker will
sink a law on vagueness grounds. One should not expect it to be any
easier, after all, to skirt the denotative deficiencies of language and
limits of legislative foresight when drafting laws that restrict (or
might restrict) speech. Nevertheless, lawmakers must work harder
at drawing boundaries when their laws run up against expressive
rights.5
2. What Penalties Are Available Against the Law's Violators?
When one considers whether a "colloquially vague" law is "con-
stitutionally vague," one important consideration is the risk one
undertakes in confronting it. "The degree of vagueness that the
Constitution will tolerate-as well as the relative importance of fair
notice and fair enforcement-depends in part on the nature of the
("Concern for vagueness in the oath cases has been especially great because uncertainty as
to an oath's meaning may deter individuals from engaging in constitutionally protected
activity conceivably within the scope of the oath.").
49. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 573 & n.10 (contrasting application of the vagueness doctrine
in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), an expression case, with "the less stringent
requirements of the modern vagueness cases dealing with purely economic regulation,"
such as United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963)).
50. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-91 (1979); Women's Med. Profl
Corp., 130 F.3d at 197.
51. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997); United States v. Thomas, 864
F.2d 188,194 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
52. Reno, 521 U.S. at 871-72 (citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1048-
51(1991)).
53. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 (citing Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S.
156, 162 (1972); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109).
54. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); see also id. at 438 ("Precision of regula-
tion must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.").
55. Cf. Thomas, 864 F.2d at 195.
56. See, e.g., id. at 194-95 (observing that it will suffice to "mark out the rough area of
prohibited conduct" in "contexts other than the First Amendment," whereas laws implicat-
ing speech rights must be drawn with at least "reasonable specificity").
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enactment."57 Thus, although civil and criminal laws alike are subject
to void-for-vagueness review," a criminal statute generally is more
susceptible to vagueness challenge than a purely civil regulation.
"The severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to re-
main silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words,
ideas, and images,""5 whereas in the civil case, "the consequences of
imprecision are qualitatively less severe." 0 That said, the Supreme
Court has written that where a law "exact[s] obedience to a rule or
standard ... so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or
standard at all," it is immaterial whether the law is enforced crimi-
nally or civilly.6 '
The cases ultimately describe a notched kind of sliding-scale ju-
risprudence, such that the greater the consequences of violation,
the more exacting vagueness scrutiny will be." Courts will look be-
neath a law's "civil" or "criminal" veneer and consider its specific
provisions. Thus, a statute promising penalties that, "although civil
in description, are penal in character," will be treated as a "quasi-
criminal" law that calls for "stricter vagueness review." 3
3. Does the Law Contain a Scienter or Mens Rea Requirement?
The Supreme Court "has long recognized that the constitution-
ality of a vague statutory standard is closely related to whether that
57. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498; see also Advance Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. United
States, 391 F.3d 377, 396 (2d Cir. 2004) ("The degree of statutory imprecision that due pro-
cess will tolerate 'varies with the nature of the enactment and the correlative needs for
notice and protection from unequal enforcement.'" (quoting Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs. v.
Abrams, 84 F.3d 602, 614 (2d Cir. 1996))).
58. See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967) (citing A.B. Small Co. v. Am. Sugar
Refinery Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925)).
59. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997) (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479, 494 (1965)).
60. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498-99 (citing Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109, 137 (1959) (Black,J., dissenting); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948) ("The
standard[] of certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is higher than in those depending
primarily upon civil sanction for enforcement.")).
61. A.B. Small Co., 267 U.S. at 239. Later decisions-Boutilier, most notably-read A.B.
Small Co.'s language as the legal standard for invalidating civil regulations on vagueness
grounds, but it is not clear that the A.B. Small Court was not describing merely a sufficient
(but not necessary) condition for invalidation. See Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 123 (quoting A.B.
Small Co., 267 U.S. at 239); Advance Pharn., 391 F.3d at 396 (citing Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 123);
Groome Resources Ltd. v. Parish ofJefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 217 (5th Cir. 2000).
62. See Advance Pharm., 391 F.3d at 396.
63. See id. (citing Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499-500; United States v. Clinical Leasing
Serv., 925 F.2d 120, 122 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying closer vagueness scrutiny of a statute
authorizing significant civil penalties)).
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standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea.",6 "[A] scienter re-
quirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect
to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is
proscribed."6 5 This is a sensible allowance, to be sure. The
constitutional problem of penalizing any person who crosses a
law's unmarked boundary is obvious. Such a law is "a trap for those
who act in good faith."' But if the same law overlays a mens rea or
scienter requirement, said liability only attaches when the defendant
can be faulted for the transgression, perhaps for acting negligently,
recklessly, willfully, or with full knowledge that he or she was within
the forbidden zone.
Although the Court did not invoke the vagueness doctrine per
se, its holding in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan"8 applied similar
considerations to the private, civil cause of action for defamation.
The Sullivan Court's ruling was predicated on a view that, in addi-
tion to regulating unprotected speech (i.e., false speech that
defames an individual'), libel laws risk chilling lawful expression,
to the extent that they impose strict liability for publishing a false
statement.o The Sullivan Court introduced the "actual malice"
standard, which requires a plaintiff public official in a defamation
case to show that the defendant uttered a falsehood either "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it
was false or not."7 1 Imposition of the malice standard rescued a tort
that, although not vague in its elements, might surely be at least
colloquially vague in the application of those elements to a given
set of facts: a speaker cannot always know with certainty the
64. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979).
65. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 (citing Colautti, 439 U.S. at 395); see also, e.g., Re-
productive Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region, Inc. v. Nixon, 428 F.3d
1139, 1143 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hsu, 364 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 2004) (uphold-
ing a criminal conviction notwithstanding a vagueness challenge, when the offense carried a
scienter element that the jury concluded was satisfied); Cal. Teachers Ass'n v. State Bd. of
Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a First Amendment vagueness
challenge on the ground that the law required a defendant to have acted "willfully and re-
peatedly" in violation of its provisions).
66. Colautti, 439 U.S. at 395 (quoting United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
67. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 148 (2007) (reciting "the general prin-
ciple that where scienter is required no crime is committed absent the requisite state of
mind" (emphasis added) (citing I WAYNE LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.1 (2d
ed. 2003))).
68. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
69. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (observing that
"there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact").
70. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 300-01 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("The opinion of the
Court conclusively demonstrates the chilling effect of the Alabama libel laws on First
Amendment freedoms in the area of race relations.").
71. Id. at 279-80.
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boundary between truth and falsehood.12 The Sullivan Court ob-
served that the Alabama libel law at issue imposed an actual malice
requirement for an award of punitive damages, but this was not
enough to save the law. The lack of a fault requirement as to truth
and falsehood was constitutionally problematic even in the context
of the simple civil remedy of compensatory damages. The Court
later held, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,75 that a state libel action may
introduce a lesser fault requirement for statements regarding per-
sons who are not public officials or public figures, but the First
Amendment commands that there be some fault requirement in
76these cases just the same.
None of the above means to suggest that any imprecise law must,
as a constitutional matter, carry a scienter or fault requirement.n7
However, the imposition of just such a requirement can be critical
711in negating a void-for-vagueness challenge, particularly when the
law regulates speech, and there may come a point where a law is so
imprecise that only the overlay of scienter will save it.
II. A VAGUENESS REVIEW OF COPYRIGHT LAW
By its terms, copyright regulates speech. It "protects" expres-
sion, and in so doing, it withdraws certain renditions of expression
from public use and reserves them to that expression's creators
and their licensees. Copyright gives private parties a right of civil
action against persons who use copyrighted expression unlawfully.
Of course, not all expression is subject to copyright,o and it may be
72. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 ("Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy
of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free debate .... And punishment
of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally
guaranteed freedoms of speech and press.").
73. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283.
74. Id. at 283-84.
75. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
76. See id. at 347.
77. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 396 (1979) ("[W]e need not now decide
whether, under a properly drafted statute, a finding of bad faith or some other type of scien-
ter would be required before a physician could be held criminally responsible for an
erroneous determination of viability.").
78. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000); United States v. Franklin-El,
554 F.3d 903, 911 (10th Cir. 2009) ("The presence of a scienter inquiry can save an other-
wise vague statute." (citation omitted)).
79. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech andInjunctions in Intel-
lectualProperty Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 165-66 (1998); Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1181.
80. Expression is not eligible for copyright protection unless it is "original," see 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006); the expression of federal government authorities is statutorily de-
nied copyright protection, see 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006); and of course expression of a certain
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that some copyrightable content, while "fixed in a[] tangible me-
dium of expression,"" is not, by its nature, "expressive" in First
812Amendment terms. Nor is it always the case that another's infring-
ing use of copyrighted content is expressive." Nonetheless, it is
very often the case that a claim of copyright infringement seeks to
enjoin expression or punish a speaker, in addition to compensat-
ing the plaintiff for losses suffered from the speaker's incursion on
the plaintiffs proprietary rights. Whether or not such a case pre-
sents a content-based or content-neutral restriction of speech (and
learned commentators are divided on the question) , the in-
fringement action restricts speech and therefore runs up against
the First Amendment.
Like most any restriction of expression, copyright proposes to
mark off unlawful, and therefore actionable, speech from protect-
85ed or privileged speech. As Section A of this Part explains, the
Supreme Court is satisfied that copyright draws its boundaries in a
manner that does not encroach upon constitutionally protected
speech. Copyright parts ways from most other speech restrictions
in that it overlays a number of interlocking legal doctrines to mark
the boundary of permissible speech. As a result, copyright con-
fronts potential speakers with a layered, uncertain, and
exceedingly complex legal paradigm. Section B of this Part ex-
plores this generalized uncertainty. Section C focuses more
specifically on the vagueness that inheres in two of copyright's con-
stituent doctrines: fair use and substantial similarity. Notably and
ironically, these are the two doctrines that, in the view of the Su-
preme Court, rescue copyright from First Amendment
overbreadth." Section D then applies the vagueness doctrine's "col-
lateral factors" to copyright.
age will shed its copyright protection and lapse into the public domain, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-
05 (2006).
81. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
82. For example, architectural works are protected by copyright, see id., but they are
not "expression" for purposes of the First Amendment.
83. A defendant who infringes by producing and selling counterfeited works is poorly
positioned to argue that his or her conduct is expressive-as is the user of peer-to-peer file
sharing networks who downloads or makes available for download digital copies of enter-
tainment works.
84. See Bohannan, supra note 6, at 1108-09. Compare Lemley & Volokh, supra note 79,
at 186 ("Copyright liability turns on the content of what is published."), with Netanel, supra
note 1, at 48 ("To my mind, however, logical and doctrinal consistency strongly favors classi-
fying copyright law as content-neutral, not content-based, regulation.").
85. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 79, at 166-69.
86. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003).
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A. Overbreadth Challenges to Copyright
The Supreme Court has never subjected the Copyright Act to
meaningful First Amendment review. 7 Rather than turn a settled,
stable legal paradigm on its head, the Court has looked to preexist-
ing checks on proprietary rights to justify copyright's incursions on
the expressive rights of the public. In Eldred v. Ashcroft," the Su-
preme Court held that "copyright law contains built-in First
Amendment accommodations"-namely, the fair use defense and
the "idea/expression dichotomy," by which copyright protects only
expression and reserves ideas for public use.89 The Eldred Court re-
jected the lower court's suggestion that copyrights might be
"categorically immune from challenges under the First Amend-
ment,"0 but it noted that close First Amendment review of the
Copyright Act will remain unnecessary, so long as the "traditional
contours of copyright protection" remain unchanged by Con-
gress.1 One can argue that the Court blithely accepted a pragmatic
answer, that copyright does not offend the First Amendment, and
worked backward to justify it. "The First Amendment securely pro-
tects the freedom to make-or decline to make-one's own
speech," the Eldred Court pronounced; "it bears less heavily when
speakers assert the right to make other people's speeches."9 2
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises," an earlier case
in which the Supreme Court considered constitutional objections to
a copyright infringement action, the Court embraced the proposi-
tion that "copyright's idea/expression dichotomy strikes a
definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copy-
right Act by permitting free communication of facts while still
87. See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1181 (observing that as of 1970, the conflict between
copyright and the First Amendment was "largely ignored"); Netanel, supra note 1, at 3 &
nn.7-8 (asserting that most courts "have summarily rejected copyright infringement free
speech defenses" and that "[i]n almost every instance [they] have assumed that First
Amendment values are fully and adequately protected by limitations on copyright owner
rights within copyright doctrine itself").
88. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
89. See id. at 219-20 (citing Harper & Row, Publ'rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 556, 560 (1985)).
90. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
91. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221; see generally Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1091 & n.9
(10th Cir. 2010) (upholding the Uruguay Round Agreements Act's amendment to the Cop-
yright Act, which withdrew certain foreign works from the public domain, against First
Amendment challenge in part on the ground that the amendment "does not disturb the[]
traditional, built-in protections" of fair use and idea versus expression).
92. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
93. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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protecting an author's expression."" For its part, Harper & Row did
not, as the Eldred Court later would," assign any similar constitu-
tional importance to fair use, which it characterized instead as a
common law privilege and "equitable rule of reason."6 Although
the Harper & Row and Eldred Courts reach their conclusions in so
many words, the curtness with which the decisions disposed of the
copyright-as-speech-restriction issue suggests a view of the Justices
that copyright, at least in its present configuration, is not over-
broad." That is, it reserves to the public all expression that the
First Amendment would otherwise protect.
B. The "Insanely Complex and Vague Rules" of Copyright, Generally
The copyright infringement action differs from the run-of-the-
mill content restriction in that it operates along a number of
analytical axes. For example, applying a content restriction ordi-
narily turns on only two variables: the content of the expression
subject to enforcement and the susceptibility of the applicable pro-
vision of law to interpretation.9' In copyright, a third variable-the
protected content-complicates the analysis, and it is this compli-
cation that has prompted some commentators to question the
conventional wisdom that copyright is a content-based speech reg-
ulation.'00 Although, at the most basic level, the infringement
analysis simply compares the defendant's content to the plaintiff's,
the outcome of a case may well turn on other "metadata" associat-
ed with the plaintiff's content, including its originality, its date of
94. Id. at 556 (quoting Harper & Row, Publ'rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203
(2d Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-20.
96. See Harper and Row. at 550-51, 560.
97. Whether or not this is actually true-that the Copyright Act is not vulnerable to a
First Amendment challenge of overbreadth-is a question worth considering, but outside
the scope of this Article.
98. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 19 (2004).
99. See, for example, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), in which the question of
criminal liability required a review of the defendant's speech-a profane inscription about
the draft on his jacket-against a general purpose state law prohibition against "disturb[ing]
the peace." Id. at 16. Putting aside for the moment the First Amendment defense at the
heart of the Supreme Court's decision, prima facie liability requires that two variables be
fixed: one must interpret the law to define the zone of unlawful conduct, and one must
determine whether the defendant's conduct lies within or outside that zone.
100. See Netanel, supra note 1, at 48-50. Professor Netanel describes copyright as a
"content-sensitive," but not "content-based" restriction, because in the zone of copyright,
government is not concerned with the "communicative impact" of the speech on listeners,
but with its "deleterious impact on the copyright incentive." Id. at 48-49. Accordingly, the
lawfulness of the speech depends on the further variable of preexisting, similar expression.
See id. at 49-50.
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creation, the identity of its author, and perhaps even the date of
the author's death. Assuming we can conclude, after fixing these
three variables at the point of litigation, that the defendant's con-
tent infringes the plaintiff's, there remains the question of
statutory privileges, including fair use, that the Copyright Act re-
serves to the public.'o'
To elaborate, when a court considers a claim of copyright in-
fringement, four "top-level" questions arise: first, whether the work
allegedly infringed is eligible for copyright protection; second,
whether the plaintiff has standing to sue to enforce the copyright;
third, whether with regard to the work the alleged infringer has
exercised any of the exclusive rights reserved to the plaintiff; and
fourth, whether the defendant's use of the content is privileged by
law. To answer any one of these four fundamental questions, a
court may be required to apply one or more subsidiary legal doc-
trines. As to the first, is the allegedly infringed work original?102 IS it
"fixed in a[] tangible medium of expression?"'0 3 Has the work en-
tered the public domain?'04 On the second top-level question, is the
plaintiff the author of the allegedly infringed work?0 Is the work a
"work made for hire?"'06 If not the owner at the instant of creation,
has the plaintiff validly acquired the rights by written assignment""
or obtained an exclusive license that confers standing to sue for
infringement?' 0 On the third top-level question, if the defendant
did not exactly copy the work, is it substantially similar to the plain-
tiff's copyrighted expression?"' As to the fourth, did the defendant
101. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-112 (2006). When courts sustain a challenge of First Amend-
ment overbreadth, they read the Constitution to impose public privileges from outside the
law. Copyright's affirmative defense of fair use, which recently acquired a kind of constitu-
tional significance, does the same work.
102. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345
(1991) ("The sine qua non of copyright is originality.").
103. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); see Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004).
104. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (reviewing constitutional chal-
lenges to extension of the copyright term).
105. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 201 (a) (2006) (providing that copyright "vests initially in the author
or authors of the work").
106. See, e.g., Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 185-86
(2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the work-for-hire doctrine of 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) vested owner-
ship of copyright in the creator's employer). See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining
"work made for hire"); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (sup-
plying extensive further analysis and commentary on the statutorily defined term).
107. See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2006).
108. See Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1146 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that a non-exclusive licensee lacks standing to sue to enforce the licensed
copyright); United States v. Chalupnik, 514 F.3d 748, 753 (8th Cir. 2008) (observing that
only exclusive licensees can sue for infringement).
109. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand,J.).
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make "fair use" of the plaintiff's content?"o Does the defendants'
use fall within any of the several specifically stated privileges in the
Copyright Act?'" All of these second-level questions are material to,
and the answer to any one could be dispositive of, the sort of expres-
sion the Copyright Act allows. For one reason or another--extensive
judicial elaboration of the legal standards at hand, further complexi-
ty baked within the very copyright statutes, or some combination of
the two-few of these issues are easily resolved.
Considering the substantial interplay between certain of the
doctrines, the copyright scheme becomes even more convoluted in
its structure. For example, originality and the idea/expression di-
chotomy are relevant to ownership. A purported joint owner of a
copyright must have contributed some quantum of copyrightable
content to the work."' That quantum of content must satisfy the
law's requirement of originality, and what is more, it cannot be
simply an original idea. It must also be original expression.'1 3 Like-
wise, the "substantial similarity" test for infringement, discussed in
greater detail below,"' requires not just that the works be similar,
but that the defendant's work must demonstrate substantial simi-
larity to protected elements within the original work."'
The provisions of law in 17 U.S.C. §§ 302 to 305, relating to cop-
yright duration, comprise a thicket of their own."6 The intricacy of
the copyright duration provisions, and the multiplicity of statutory
categories of works subject to terms of differing length, is the result
of several legislative undertakings to amend and reform the dura-
tion scheme, most of which did not have retroactive application.1
110. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); see also infra Part II.C.2.
111. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2006) (reproduction privileges of libraries and archives);
§ 110(1) (face-to-face teaching exception); § 110(3) (limited performance privilege "in the
course of services at a place of worship or other religious assembly").
112. E.g., Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658 (7th Cir. 2004) ("There has to be
some original expression contributed by anyone who claims to be a co-author, and the
rule ... is that his contribution must be independently copyrightable."); see also Medforms,
Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Solutions, Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2002).
113. E.g., Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 658; Medforms, 290 F.3d at 108.
114. See infra Part II.C.1.
115. E.g., Universal Furniture Int'l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 618 F.3d 417,
436 (4th Cir. 2010); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 70
(2d Cir. 1999).
116. Eric M. Fraser, Antitrust and the Google Books Settlement: The Problem of Simultaneity,
2010 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 1, 10 n.10 (2010) (setting forth some of the particulars of the
Copyright Act's duration provisions); see also CORNELL COPYRIGHT INFORMATION CENTER,
COPYRIGHT TERM AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES (2010), available at
http://copyright.comell.edu/resources/publicdomain.cfm.
117. See 9 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.01 (Mat-
thew Bender, rev. ed. 2011) ("Successive lengthening of the period of protection leaves
works subject to disparate terms, depending on when they were created in relation to the
schemes later adopted during the period of their protection.").
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Although precisely written, the copyright term provisions call for
an analytical parsing so intricate and involved as to be daunting to
the layman and tiresome for the lawyer.1 18 Moreover, several critical
facts pertinent to public domain determination are often not easily
ascertained by research. Some examples include (1) the dates of a
work's creation and first publication,"9 (2) whether a work was
made for hire,o (3) whether the author is alive (and if not, when
121he or she died), (4) whether a rightsholder was eligible to renew
the copyright term, and (5) if so, whether he or she accom-
plished the formalities requisite for renewal.'2 3 As a result, it is no
easy task to discern whether and when a given work has lapsed into
the public domain.' To be sure, the notice failure here does not
necessarily inhere in the law: the root of the problem in making a
public domain determination is that the facts required to apply the
law in a given instance are too often lost to history. That said, alt-
hough the law on copyright duration is not unclear, it is baroque in
its presentation and terribly complex.
The preceding discussion of copyright's vagaries is of course far
from exhaustive. It should be sufficient to note the following: any
118. Andrew Chin, Foreword, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 401, 402 (2010) (acknowledging Pro-
fessor Laura Gasaway for her publication of a chart that "untangles the intricate interplay
among various copyright term provisions in the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts, the Berne
Convention Implementation Act, and the Copyright Term Extension Act"); D'Lesli M. Da-
vis, The Copyright Primer for the Lawyer Who Doesn't Even Know How To Spell Copywrite, Er,
Copyright, 45 THE ADVOCATE (TEXAS) 31, 33 (2008) ("The Act provides complex schemes for
determination of the term of copyright protection in works created prior to January 1, 1978,
and non-copyright lawyers should probably head to an expert if the copyright in question is
pre-1978.").
119. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006) (applying to works created on or afterJanuary 1, 1978); id.
§§ 303, 304 (applying to works created beforeJanuary 1, 1978).
120. Id. § 302(c); § 303(a)(1)(B)(2) (specifying copyright terms for works made for
hire).
121. See id. § 302(a)-(b) (providing a copyright term of life of the author(s) plus seven-
ty years, for works created afterJanuary 1, 1978).
122. See id. § 304(a) (specifying a copyright term for works eligible for term renewals as
ofJanuary 1, 1978).
123. See 9 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 117, § 9.05 (observing that for pre-1978 works,
a failure to file a timely renewal registration before expiration of the initial 28-year term
would cause a work to lapse into the public domain by default).
124. There is hope that the Internet and digital media will supply opportunities to alle-
viate this problem through database management and increased collaboration. See, e.g., The
Deterninator: Behind the Scenes at the Stanford Copyright Renewal Database, available at http://
fairuse.stanford.edu/commentary and_analysis/2007_08_calter.html (last visited Dec. 11,
2010) (discussing Stanford University's effort to compile variously formatted Copyright
Office registration and renewal records into a single online database); WorldCat Copyright
Evidence Registry, http://www.worldcat.org/copyrightevidence/registry/about (last visited
Dec. 11, 2010) (describing WorldCat's collaborative platform for sharing information perti-
nent to the copyright status of books). Some certainties emerge: most notably, a work
published before 1923 is per se in the public domain. Societ6 Civile Succession Guino v. Re-
noir, 549 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 2008).
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attempt to answer the simple yes/no question of infringement
triggers a cascade of subsidiary legal questions. The very metaphor
of the ordinary content-based speech restriction, that the law
"draws a boundary" between lawful and unlawful expression, is in-
apposite to copyright. It is true that certain subsidiary copyright
doctrines, for example, substantial similarity and fair use, may be
said to draw dividing lines. But writ large, the copyright infringe-
ment tort raises vagueness questions not because it is standardless
or because its legal standards are too imprecise, but because it is
overloaded with interlocking standards. Questions of infringement
are difficult and costly to settle at the point of litigation. It stands to
reason that at the point of expression, when a speaker is poised to
utter expression that is similar to another person's, copyright's "in-
sanely complex and vague rules," as Professor Lessig has described
them, 2 may well chill the speaker from delivering lawful speech.2
As noted above, the Supreme Court has rejected substantially
less complex regulatory schemes for political speech, on the
ground that their prolixity would offend the Constitution.12 Copy-
right, at least as it applies to expressive uses of owned content, cries
out for similar treatment. One might object here that the recent
Supreme Court cases did involve political speech, which merits the
128
highest level of First Amendment protection, whereas the Court
wrote in Eldred that the First Amendment "bears less heavily when
speakers assert the right to make other people's speeches."29 The
extent of protection owed to the underlying speech, however, is to
some extent immaterial because the chilling dynamic is the same: a
law that regulates speech based on reference to multiple factors
incorporates substantial ex ante uncertainty and therefore chills
protected speech. The Court might well regard chilled political
speech as more constitutionally consequential, but for that matter,
the Eldred Court failed to consider that "other people's speeches"
might surely be deployed for all sorts of constitutionally important
125. LESSIG, supra note 98, at 19.
126. See id. at 185 ("The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either never be exercised, or
never be exercised in the open."); Randall P. Bezanson & Joseph M. Miller, Scholarship and
Fair Use, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 409, 445 (2010) ("When ... problems [ascertaining the
boundaries of fair use] are compounded for the scholar by practical questions about copy-
rightability, the length of the copyright term, competing claimants, risk aversion, conflicts of
interest and significant financial costs of litigation, the scholarly enterprise can be, and in-
deed often is, crippled."); cf Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 889
(2010) (observing that "[p]rolix laws," like vague laws, "chill speech").
127. See supra Section I.B.
128. See RA.V v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) ("Core political speech occupies the highest, most protected position . . .
129. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
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purposes, including political argument and commentary.so And of
course, the copyright infringement action's very purpose is to get
at the question of whether the speech at issue is fairly described as
"the speaker's," and not "other people's." It therefore assumes too
much to discount vagueness concerns in copyright based on the
Court's devaluation of "other people's speech."
C. The Vagueness of Copyright's First Amendment Rescue Doctrines
At the micro-level, too, copyright law is fraught with vagueness.
Perhaps nowhere is the uncertainty more pronounced than in the
two doctrines that purport to rescue copyright from a constitution-
al claim of overbreadth: substantial similarity and fair use.
1. Substantial Similarity
The concept of "substantial similarity" is fundamental to copy-
right. We accept as black letter law that a defendant's work need
not be identical to a plaintiffs work in order to be infringing, and
we further accept that a similar but not identical work will infringe
if the similarity to another work's protected elements is "substan-
tial." As Judge Learned Hand observed in Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp.,m "[i]t is of course essential to any protection of liter-
ary property, whether at common-law or under the statute, that the
right cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would
escape by immaterial variations."'12 Yet, beyond recitals like these,
130. See Bohannan, supra note 6, at 1086 ("Unfortunately, the Court's simplistic distinc-
tion between speaking and 'making other people's speeches' cannot support the analytical
weight it is being forced to bear. The use of copyrighted material has substantial speech
value to both the user and the public, whether or not it is copied."); id. at 1091 (noting that
in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), the Court did not discount the
First Amendment interests of the New York Times in reprinting the Pentagon Papers). See
generally Tushnet, supra note 6.
131. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand,J.).
132. Id at 121; see also T-Peg, Inc. v. Vermont Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 112 (1st
Cir. 2006) (observing that "two works need not be exact copies to be substantially similar"
and that "the mere existence of differences is insufficient to end the matter in the defend-
ant's favor"); Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 511 (7th Cir.
1994).
In their review of copyright claims, factfinders may have occasion to assess the "similarity"
of two works twice-and for two different purposes: the first toward the end of proving that
the defendant "actually copied" his or her copyrighted content, and the second to show that
the defendant's content is substantially similar to the copyright-protected elements of the
plaintiffs work. Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 63 (2d
Cir. 2010); Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ASP Consulting LLC, 560 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2009)
(citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)). There is
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decades of applying the substantial similarity "test" have brought
little clarity to the law. Nimmer does not court controversy when he
writes that "[t] he determination of the extent of similarity that will
constitute a substantial, and hence infringing, similarity presents
one of the most difficult questions in copyright law, and one that is
the least susceptible of helpful generalizations."
The case law commonly recites that works are substantially similar
only if they are substantially similar in both their ideas and expres-
sion.1 3 ' That a defendant copied the plaintiff's idea is not enough to
prove infringement, and in this respect the requirement to prove
substantial similarity of expression gives effect in the courts to copy-
right's idea/expression dichotomy.3 In the "abstractions" passage of
his decision in Nichols, Judge Hand famously observed that there is a
point at which two works, although similar, sufficiently diverge in
their expression as to support a finding of no infringement, on the
ground that the defendant only copied ideas:
Upon any work,. . . a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the inci-
dent is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the
most general statement of what the play is about, and at times
might consist of only its title; but there is a point in this series
of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since oth-
erwise the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to
which, apart from their expression, his property is never ex-
tended. 136
The problem courts continue to face is in specifying, in a man-
ner that will permit useful guidance to speakers ex ante, precisely
where that flexion point lies, beyond which copied ideas become
potential for confusion here, and the Second Circuit has proposed to label the first test-
the test of similarity that, with access, is probative of "actual copying"-as the "probative
similarity" test. Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 889 n.1 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Laureyssens v.
Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992)); see also T-Peg, 459 F.3d at 112. Although
these two tests are undertaken for different purposes, one "merges somewhat" with the oth-
er. See T-Peg, 459 F.3d at 112; see also Coquico, Inc. v. Rodriguez-Miranda, 562 F.3d 62, 67 n.3
(1st Cir. 2009).
133. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 117, § 13.03; see also Amy B. Cohen, Masking
Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
719, 721-23 (1987); William Patry, Does Substantial Similarity Analysis Make Sense?,
THE PATRY COPYRIGHT BLOc (Sep. 08, 2005, 10:02 AM), http://williampatry.blogspot.com/
2005/09/does-substantial-similarity-analysis.html.
134. See e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 1977); Gaito Architecture, 602 F.3d at 67 (citing Reyher v. Children's
Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1976)).
135. Gaito Architecture, 602 F.3d at 67; Krofft Television Prods., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1165.
136. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
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copied expression, and permissibly similar expression becomes
substantially similar expression. Judge Hand himself wrote despair-
ingly in the Nichols case: "Nobody has ever been able to fix that
boundary, and nobody ever can."'3 7 "[A]s soon as literal appropria-
tion ceases to be the test," Judge Hand added, "the whole matter is
necessarily at large, so that . .. the decisions cannot help much in a
new case."'" Thirty years later, he was no more hopeful: "Obviously,
no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond
copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions
must therefore inevitably be ad hoc." 03
More recent decisions applying substantial similarity strive to
give content to the test, but these decisions, too, express misgivings
about the feasibility of the project.'4 In many cases, courts simply
overlay analytical frameworks that do little to elaborate the doctrine,
reciting, for example, that substantial similarity is to be assessed
from the perspective of the "ordinary observer."4 ' The invocation
of the "ordinary observer" participates in the "reasonable man"
tradition of tort law, which has long been subject to criticism for its
indeterminacy.'4 ' The "ordinary observer" test proposes to settle
137. Id.
138. Id. ("In determining the effect of the use of [copyrighted] material, we can derive
little aid from a restatement of the decisions arrived at by the courts in the reported cases,
for each case was decided upon its own facts." (citing Fendler v. Morosco, 171 N.E. 56, 60
(N.Y. 1930))).
139. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960);
see also, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 14 ("Distinguishing ideas from expression is notori-
ously tricky."); Stephen McJohn, Scary Patents, 7 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 343, 347
(2009) (characterizing copyright's idea/expression distinction as "illusory").
140. See, e.g., BUC Int'l Corp. v. Int'l Yacht Council Ltd., 489 F.3d 1129, 1148 (11th Cir.
2007) (observing that substantial similarity "occupies a non-quantifiable value on the legal
spectrum between no similarity and identicalness"); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356
(9th Cir. 1990) ("It is thus impossible to articulate a definitive demarcation that measures
when the similarity between works involves copying of protected expression . . . ."); Univer-
sal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3rd Cir. 1975) ("A review of copyright
infringement decisions confirms the observation that most cases are decided on an ad hoc
basis."); Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 290 (D.N.J. 1993) ("As courts and com-
mentators have repeatedly noted, the test for substantial similarity is difficult to define and
vague to apply. . . .").
141. Coquico, Inc. v. Rodriguez-Miranda, 562 F.3d 62, 67 (Ist Cir. 2009); Incredible
Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 2005).
142. See RobertJ. Rhee, Tort Arbitrage, 60 FLA. L. REV. 125, 171-72 (2008) (quoting, inter
alia, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 88-89 (Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed., The
Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881) ("vague test")). Indeed, the "ordinary
observer" standard even invites comparison with the "men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning" test for vagueness, Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391 (1926), which, as standards go, hardly draws a useful boundary between a constitu-
tional and an unconstitutional law. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47. Reference to
these fictional personifications of objectivity becomes ever more constitutionally problemat-
ic when one proposes to apply them to speech restrictions.
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the infringement question based on whether said observer would
be "disposed to overlook any disparities in the works."1 43 Articulated
in this way, the standard approaches tautology.'" Citing Judge
Hand and Professor Nimmer, the Second Circuit observes that the
question "typically presents an extremely close question of fact"
that is generally not appropriate for summary judgment.4 5 Pre-
sumably, then, the ordinary observer approach to substantial
similarity is uncertain enough that reasonable minds can disagree
on whether a given instance of expression is unlawful.' 6 That sort
of uncertainty surely chills speech.
The Ninth Circuit appears to be the court most determined to
develop a working ex ante standard for substantial similarity, with
the result that perhaps no other court has made such a tangle of
the doctrine. Ninth Circuit law requires fact finders assessing sub-
stantial similarity to apply both "extrinsic" and "intrinsic" tests.147
The extrinsic test, which calls for "analytic dissection" and often
"expert testimony," seeks out similarity in "the type of artwork
involved, the materials used, the subject matter, and the setting for
the subject."'" In the case of literary works, the extrinsic test calls
for objective comparison of the works' respective plots, themes,
143. Coquico, 562 F.3d at 67; see also Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev.
Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 2010).
144. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 1977) ("To constitute an infringement, the copying must reach the
point of 'unlawful appropriation,' or the copying of the protected expression itself."); see also
Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 373 (5th Cir. 2004) (re-
counting the plaintiffs argument that jury instructions on substantial similarity were "merely
tautological, essentially stating nothing more than that two works are substantially similar if
they are substantially similar"). It is noteworthy that the Positive Black Talk court never direct-
ly addressed the plaintiffs "tautology" challenge; it simply sustained the trial court's
instructions on the ground that they tracked Fifth Circuit precedent. Id. at 374.
145. Gaito Architecture, 602 F.3d at 63 ("[Slummary judgment has traditionally been
frowned upon in copyright litigation." (quoting Hoehling v. Universal City Studios Inc., 618
F.2d 972, 972 (2d Cir. 1980))).
146. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (providing that summary judgment is appropriate only when
"the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any materialfact and the movant is enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law") (emphasis added).
147. See Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 624 (9th Cir. 2010); Shaw v.
Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990).
148. See Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1356.
149. See Krofft Television Prods., 562 F.2d at 1164. It is by virtue of the extrinsic test, with
its gestures toward objective analysis, that the Ninth Circuit is perhaps more amenable than
its sister circuits to ruling on substantial similarity as a matter of law. See Benay, 607 F.3d at
624 (observing that substantial similarity is a "fact-specific" inquiry, but one as to which the
Ninth Circuit has "frequently" been in a position to affirm entry of summary judgment for
copyright defendants); Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1077
(9th Cir. 2006) ("A plaintiff who cannot satisfy the extrinsic test necessarily loses on sum-
mary judgment, because ajury may not find substantial similarity without evidence on both
the extrinsic and intrinsic tests." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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dialogue, mood, setting, pace, and sequence."50 By contrast, the in-
trinsic test reprises the "ordinary observer" test discussed above, 5 1
and at least one court has described its application, critically, as
"virtually devoid of analysis," the exercise of "a mere subjective
judgment as to whether two literary works are or are not similar."5 2
And so the Ninth Circuit's model of substantial similarity admits
speech-averse uncertainty coming and going.
The extrinsic test is multifactorial, intricate, and complex: that
is, just the sort of analysis the WRTL Court rejected in the context
of speech restrictions, on the ground that a speaker cannot expect
to settle the extent of his or her expressive rights without resort to
costly litigation. 5 The intrinsic test, for its part, disposes of an in-
fringement question based on the gut-feel of the fact finder.15 4
Perhaps the two tests are complementary, each compensating for
the deficiencies of the other. Indeed, the fact that the plaintiff
must satisfy both tests may be a boon to free expression, but the
practical effect of the Ninth Circuit's approach is to heap one
vague legal standard on top of another. This model may be
defensible to the extent that it systematizes the manner in which
courts address infringement questions. It does not, however, pro-
vide fair notice to speakers, and the essential problem of
substantial similarity's vagueness remains unresolved despite all the
courts' efforts.
2. Fair Use
A fair use of copyrighted content is not an actionable infringe-
ment of copyright."" By definition, then, fair use distinguishes
lawful use from unlawful use, and as applied to expressive uses,1
150. See Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1356-57; Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.
1984).
151. See, e.g., Benay, 607 F.3d at 624 (explaining that the intrinsic test "'focuses on
whether the ordinary, reasonable audience would find the works substantially similar in the
total concept and feel of the works'" (quoting Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d
815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
152. Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1357.
153. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469
(2007).
154. William Parry writes generally of the subjectivity of the substantial similarity test
"Right now, copyright law exists at the crude level of Potter Stewart's 'I know it when I see
it.'" SeePatry, supra note 133.
155. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
156. Just as not all uses of content are expressive, see supra text accompanying notes 80-
82, not all fair uses are expressive, either. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d
1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (reverse engineering of software as fair use); Field v. Google
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fair use theoretically draws a line between what can and cannot be
spoken. Indeed, as we have noted, the law relies on fair use to
carve out adequate space from copyright for free expression. The
Supreme Court's holdings on this score, which maintain that fair
use accomplishes this task sufficiently well to settle any constitu-
tional quarrel with the copyright regime, 5 have been received with
skepticism by commentators. 58 The concerns expressed in the lit-
erature relate to the positioning of the line fair use draws; that is,
they wonder whether fair use falls short of privileging otherwise
infringing uses of content that should be protected by the First
Amendment. These concerns relate to copyright's overbreadth.
Whether fair use actually draws any line at all is a question that
bears on copyright's constitutionality under the vagueness doc-
trine. This question is one that is easily and immediately answered:
it does not. The statutory language in 17 U.S.C. § 107 is assuredly
vague on its face: "the fair use of a copyrighted work ... for pur-
poses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ...
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright."' To
its credit, the law offers examples of appropriate purposes-core
fair use values-for which one may make use of copyrighted con-
tent. But, as Congress has written § 107, use of content even for
these purposes is not per se lawful: the use must also be "fair."
Whether or not the effect of this language is ultimately speech-
protective, from the standpoint of balancing creators' rights
against public privileges, the law misses an opportunity to supply
some clarity. Likewise, § 107's list of approved purposes is not ex-
clusive. 6 0 The fact that copyrighted content might be lawfully used
for all manner of unlisted purposes could help to overcome com-
plaints about copyright's overbreadth, but in this respect, too, the
statute displays a hostility to definition.
To be sure, § 107 does provide guidance beyond its simple
statement that "fair" use is lawful use. It codifies the four principal
factors that courts have historically considered in making fair use
determinations:
Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1123 (D. Nev. 2006) (indexing of web content for use in a search
engine as fair use).
157. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003); Harper & Row Publ'rs, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
158. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 6, at 547-48; Netanel, supra note 1, at 20-23.
159. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
160. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994) (interpreting
§ 107's "such as" language to be "illustrative and not limitative"); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d
244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78).
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(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in re-
lation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.'
These factors may give structure to a court's post hoc fair use
analysis, but a speech law characterized by such an "open-ended
rough-and-tumble of factors" will assuredly chill lawful expres-
sion.'16 It bears mentioning, too, that the statute does not constrain
a court's review to these four factors. ' At least one commentator
has described § 107 as "almost entirely useless analytically, except
to the extent that it structures the collection of evidence that a
court might think relevant.. ... "' In this respect the law standing
alone, without the additional gloss supplied by the cases, surely
falls short of the bare minimum requirement that courts impose in
vagueness cases; that is, § 107 is "so vague and indefinite as really to
be no rule or standard at all.""
Ultimately, though, the fair use doctrine is comprised almost en-
tirely of judge-made law. The fair use inquiry, with all its factors,
whether statutorily imposed or applied ad hoc in litigation, reduces
to an "equitable rule of reason."'6 It was and is a creature of the
common law, requiring case-by-case adjudication,'6 7 and yet fair use
(like substantial similarity) stands out in the common law for the
161. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
162. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007)
(quoting Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 547
(1995)).
163. See Petter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d
1287, 1307-08 (11th Cir. 2008); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 939
(2d Cir. 1994) ("[T]he statutory list is not exhaustive or exclusive." (citing Harper & Row
Publ'rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985))).
164. Michael J. Madison, A Patterm-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1525, 1564 (2004).
165. A.B. Small Co. v. Am. Sugar Refinery Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925).
166. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574-78 (1990) (describing
fair use's origins in the common law and affirming the Copyright Act's commitment to the
"common-law tradition" of "case-by-case analysis" of fair use); see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S.
at 549-50.
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failure of its decisions to supply any real predictive guidance to fu-
ture content users. Some general principles may be distilled from
the case law, but in the end, the law cannot hope to capture ex ante
even a fraction of the uses one can make of copyrighted content,
so every case is sui generis.
Small wonder, then, that Professor Rubenfeld should pronounce
fair use "notoriously opaque,"16 9 or that other commentators might
label it "resistant to generalization," "unpredictable," and "subjec-
tive.', 0 Subjectivity is, of course, derivative of these other defects:
an altogether unanswerable question, posed to different authori-
ties, will of course yield different answers. Judge Leval commented
that the fair use doctrine admits subjectivity even in its core appli-
cations: "[h]istorians, biographers, critics, scholars, and journalists
regularly quote from copyrighted matter to make points essential
to their instructive undertakings. Whether their takings will pass,
the fair use test is difficult to predict. It depends on widely varying
perceptions held by different judges.""'
It has been suggested that fair use's "open-endedness" and the
prospect of reversal by an appeals court may make ruling on the
defense "an intimidating experience" for trial courtjudges."2 If the
very essence of a vague law is that "men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion,"' it should raise a red flag that learned judges find the fair
use doctrine so unsettling. After all, ajudge who guesses wrong will
receive only a chastening reversal from the Court of Appeals. A
168. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1106 (2007)
("[L]eading courts and commentators generally acknowledge that the four-factor test as
interpreted provides very little guidance for predicting whether a particular use will be
deemed fair.").
169. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 16-17. Professor Rubenfeld notes in passing that the
"vagueness of the fair use doctrine is .. . a First Amendment problem." Id. at 17 n.75.
170. Id. at 16-17 (quoting Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doc-
trine, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1137, 1138 (1990) ("resistant to generalization")); Naomi Abe
Voetgli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 1213, 1266 (1997) ("unpredictable, if
not incomprehensible"); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1005 (1990)
("subjective")).
171. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1132
(1990); see also id. at 1135 ("Writers, publishers, and other would-be fair-users lack a reliable
guide on how to govern their conduct.").
172. See William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions,
and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 670 (1993). On this point, Patry quotesJudge
Leval's candid admission that "[i]t has been exhilarating to find myself present at the cut-
ting edge of the law, even though in the role of the salami." Id. at 670 n.18 (quoting Pierre
N. Leval, Fair Use or Foul? The Nineteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 36 J. CORP. Soc'Y
167, 168 (1989)).
173. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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speaker whose ex ante assessment of his case differs from a court's
faces the prospect of statutory damages.
Access to legal counsel does not improve matters. Professor
Fisher observed in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in
Harper & Row that attorneys advising scholars on the use of copy-
righted content all but encouraged their clients to avoid relying on
the defense."1 4 Professor Fisher wrote that "the disarray of the doc-
trine impairs the ability of the creators and users of intellectual
products to ascertain their rights and to adjust their conduct ac-
cordingly.""
For all the work they do to reconcile copyright and the First
Amendment, the substantial similarity and fair use defenses give
with one hand and take with the other. By their nature, they define
what expression infringes copyright, but the two rescue doctrines
are not themselves susceptible to ex ante definition. It is a rather se-
vere irony that these two doctrines are assigned the constitutional
business of carving out space for protected speech, yet they give so
little notice to speakers as to what speech falls within and without
that protected zone.
D. Application of the Vagueness Doctrine's Collateral Factors to Copyright
To assess the full extent of the constitutional problem of copy-
right's vagueness, the law must be reviewed against the vagueness
doctrine's three collateral factors. That review reveals that copy-
right law burdens constitutionally protected rights, that the
infringement action contains a quasi-criminal remedy in the right
of plaintiffs to select statutory damages, and that the law lacks a
meaningful scienter requirement.
174. See William T. Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659,
1692-94 (1988) (describing university counsel advice regarding classroom uses of copy-
righted content as "distinctly unhelpful" (citing Dale P. Olson, Copyright and Fair Use:
Implications of Nation Enterprises for Higher Education, 12 J.C & U.L. 489, 508 (1986); Michael
Les Benedict, Historians and the Continuing Controversy over Fair Use of Unpublished Manuscript
Materials, 91 Am. HIsT. REv. 859, 875 (1986))).
175. Fisher, supra note 174, at 1693; see also Randall P. Bezanson & Joseph M. Miller,
Scholarship and Fair Use, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 409, 445 (2010) ("The strictly legal problems
presented for fair use scholarly claims are themselves complex, usually indeterminate and
sufficiently real to force a busy scholar without large resources and a risk-averse publisher to
back down, if challenged, or simply to avoid any risk, even if there is no real likelihood of it
ripening into a claim.").
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1. Copyright Restricts the Exercise of Constitutionally
Protected Rights
As noted above, it is uncontroversial that copyright restricts ex-
pression in many, if not most, of its applications.176 The law sets
aside proprietary rights in original expression and imposes legal
liability on speakers whose own expression "copies" the appropri-
ated speech. This aspect of copyright has invited courts and
commentators alike to consider whether the infringement action
might in turn infringe the First Amendment rights of defendants.7 7
Copyright's tension with First Amendment values therefore puts
the infringement action on the same footing as the content-based
speech regulations to which courts have applied close scrutiny un-
der the vagueness doctrine.
2. Copyright Law Contains Criminal and
Quasi-Criminal Remedies
Copyrights may be enforced civilly or criminally. 17 U.S.C. § 506
provides a criminal charge against certain willful infringers of cop-
yright; 18 U.S.C. § 2319 specifies the penalties for criminal
infringers, who may be imprisoned for up to ten years for their
conduct. The mens rea requirement of willfulness greatly alleviates
any concern about constitutional vagueness, because criminal lia-
bility will only attach when the defendant "intentional [ly]
violat[es] a known legal duty."' 79 It is significant, too, that the crim-
inal provisions are directed at only a subset of infringing conduct:
that is, infringement "for purposes of commercial advantage or
private financial gain," reproduction or distribution of works total-
ing over $1,000 in retail value, and digital distribution of works
"being prepared for commercial distribution."80 Although one can
imagine circumstances in which § 506 criminalizes a defendant's
own expression, the law for the most part regulates acts of in-
176. See supra text accompanying notes 79-84.
177. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); text and notes supra note 1.
178. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997) (applying close vagueness
scrutiny to content-based restrictions on speech); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33
(1963) (same).
179. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991) (quoting United States v. Bishop,
412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973) (quotation marks omitted)); accord United States v. Moran, 757 F.
Supp. 1046, 1048-49 (D. Neb. 1991) (quoting Cheek in criminal copyright infringement
proceedings in the course of rejecting the government's suggestion that willfulness requires
only that the defendant intended to copy, rather than to infringe).
180. 17U.S.C.§506(a)(1) (2006).
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fringement that are not in themselves expressive: namely, traffick-
ing in pirated and counterfeited works and copying works in bulk.
With the added overlay of the willfulness requirement to protect a
defendant from blundering into liability, copyright's expressly
criminal provisions ultimately present a less consequential vague-
ness problem than the civil infringement remedies do.
The far more common mode of copyright enforcement is the
civil action for injunctive relief and/or damages.'"' Injunctive relief
is, in essence, an instruction to discontinue infringing and is there-
fore difficult to characterize as punitive in nature, notwithstanding
that in certain applications (for example, an injunction calling for
removal of a publication from the market) a defendant can incur
significant losses as a result of compliance. An award of a plaintiffs
actual damages is compensatory and therefore civil in nature. The-
se remedies are accordingly less offensive, although not entirely
inconsequential, in the vagueness analysis."
A plaintiff's right to elect statutory damages, however, is more
problematic. Statutory damages do not only compensate a plaintiff
for his or her losses; they "sanction and vindicate the statutory pol-
icy of discouraging infringement" and are therefore both
"compensatory and punitive" in character.8 3 The Second Circuit
writes that "[t]he purpose of punitive damages-to punish and
prevent malicious conduct-is generally achieved under the Copy-
right Act through the provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2), which
allow increases to statutory damages awards in cases of willful
infringement."8 4 It bears emphasis that statutory damages do more
than "punish and prevent malicious conduct." They punish neutral
and even innocent conduct. The Copyright Act erects three tiers of
statutory damages awards: one for willful infringers (ranging from
$750 to $150,000), one for innocent infringers ($200 to $30,000),
and a generally applicable range for infringers who fall into neither
category ($750 to $30,000) . In a given case, the measure of dam-
ages adequate to compensate a rightsholder for copyright
infringement case may fall well short of the minimum figure in the
181. Id. (injunctions); id. § 504 (damages) (2006). The law also authorizes a court to
order the confiscation and/or destruction of infringing articles. Id. § 503 (2006).
182. See Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 726 F. Supp. 953, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (refusing to ap-
ply the vagueness doctrine to invalidate a civil suit over commercial speech and
distinguishing the defendant's citations to cases in which vague laws provided for criminal
fines and incarceration).
183. Dream Games of Ariz., Inc. v. PC Onsite, 561 F.Sd 983, 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (quot-
ing L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l, 149 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 1998)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
184. On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001).
185. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c); see infra Part II.D.3.
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applicable statutory damages range. Where this occurs, the civil
infringement action takes on a punitive character"' and ought to
be recognized as "quasi-criminal" in the Supreme Court's vague-
ness analysis.'
The availability of statutory damages in civil copyright infringe-
ment actions presents the worst of both worlds from a vagueness
perspective, as the law imposes an extra-compensatory and there-
fore punitive remedy without supplying the many procedural
protections due to criminal defendants.'" One at risk of criminal
penalties between $750 and $30,000 must be proved guilty of the
pertinent offense beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas statutory
damages in copyright suits are available on a more-probable-than-
not standard of proof.'0 Moreover, a criminal defendant would
have to catch the attention of a prosecutor, who does not stand to
benefit financially from the windfall of an extra-compensatory
remedy. The rightsholder can bring a civil suit at his or her initia-
tive and will likely be more motivated to do so.
186. For example, in Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 112 (D.
Mass. 2010), a recent case involving a challenge to a statutory damages award, the court
estimated that a jury's award of statutory damages of $22,500 per instance of willful in-
fringement amounted to at least a 1500:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, adding
that the figure could rise as high as 32,143:1, based on market pricing of the infringed
works. Assuming arguendo that Mr. Tenenbaum was neither willful nor innocent in his in-
fringement, the minimum statutory damages of $750 per infringement would prescribe at
least a 50:1 ratio. The $200 minimum award for innocent infringement would have pun-
ished Mr. Tenenbaum at more than 13 times the rate of damages actually caused to the
plaintiffs.
187. See Alan E. Garfield, The Case for First Amendment Limits on Copyright Law, 35
HoFsTnu L. REV. 1169, 1206 (2007) (describing "high statutory damages awards" as "puni-
tive-like" and suggesting that the prospect of such awards may chill free speech); Celia
Goldwag, Note, Copyright Infringement and the First Amendment, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 320, 336
(1979) ("When statutory damages exceed what would be necessary to compensate the copy-
right holder, they have the effect of penalizing the infringer's speech.").
188. Where it does not occur, then the appropriate award, and the one a plaintiff
should favor, is one for actual damages.
189. Cf N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-78 (1964) (describing the meas-
ure of damages available under a state civil libel law; noting that "ordinary criminal-law
safeguards" like "an indictment and ... proof beyond a reasonable doubt" were not availa-
ble to the civil defendant; and ultimately characterizing the law as "a form of regulation that
creates hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than those that attend reliance
upon the criminal law" (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
190. See, e.g., PODS, Inc. v. Porta Stor, Inc., 484 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (apply-
ing Eleventh Circuit law); Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens, Inc., 241 F.3d 350, 358 (4th Cir.
2001).
Copyright and the Vagueness Doctine
3. A Civil Action for Copyright Infringement
Does Not Require Proof of Scienter
Although criminal copyright infringement requires proof of will-
fulness,"' civil copyright infringement is a strict liability action:
liability attaches regardless of the infringer's knowledge or intent. 2
To be sure, the law provides stronger civil remedies for willful
infringement,"s but, all the same, an award of statutory damages is
available absent proof of willfulness and even in cases where the fact-
finder is satisfied that the defendant inadvertently infringed the
copyright.""
The Copyright Act does make some gestures in the direction of
protecting defendants who have acted in good faith. For example,
a court may reduce an award of statutory damages to as low as $200
per instance of infringement if the defendant infringer can estab-
lish that he or she "was not aware and had no reason to believe that
his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright."'5 Yet this
provision falls far short of a scienter requirement as an element of
infringement. The defendant bears the burden of proving innocent
infringement of this sort,196 liability attaches notwithstanding an in-
nocent infringer finding,' 7 and the court retains the discretion not
to reduce the damages award, notwithstanding the evidence the
defendant may offer on this point.'" Moreover, the Copyright Act
empowers a rightsholder to overcome an innocent infringer de-
fense simply by posting a copyright notice on published content to
191. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006).
192. See, e.g., Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 537
(6th Cir. 2004) (citing Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1997)); Shapiro, Bern-
stein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963); see also Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle
Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931) ("Intention to infringe is not essential.
193. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006) (setting a $150,000 ceiling for statutory damage
awards in cases where the plaintiff has proved willful infringement, as opposed to a $30,000
ceiling in cases where willfulness has not been proved).
194. See id. § 504(c).
195. See id. § 504(c) (2).
196. See id. (authorizing a reduction in statutory damages "[iun a case where the in-
fringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds" innocent infringement); Basic
Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1544 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
197. See Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The fact that infringement
is 'subconscious' or 'innocent' does not affect liability, although it may have some bearing
on remedies."); ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998-99 (2d Cir.
1983) (observing that "innocent copying can nevertheless constitute an infringement")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
198. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Garcia, 996 F. Supp.
770, 772 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (writing that the court would exercise its discretion not to reduce a
statutory damages award, "even if Garcia could 'sustain the burden of proving' that his in-
fringement was innocent").
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which the defendant is proved to have had access."9 Courts hold
that a plaintiff satisfies the "access" requirement merely by showing
that it published a work with the notice affixed to it; the plaintiff
need not prove that the defendant personally encountered the no-
tice .200 Remarkably, a plaintiffs copyright notice will defeat any sort
of innocent infringer defense, even one in which the defendant
concedes an awareness that the content was copyrighted and in-
stead interposes a good faith belief that his or her use was fair or
not substantially similar to the noticed content.20'
Copyright incorporates a more robust good faith defense that
requires a court to remit an award of statutory damages in its en-
tirety, but its availability is substantially more limited: the
defendant must have relied on fair use (as opposed to simply be-
lieving, say, that his or her work was not substantially similar to the
plaintiff's, or that the plaintiffs work was in the public domain),
and that reliance must have been objectively reasonable.202 Even so,
only two categories of infringer are entitled to statutory remittitur
on these grounds. First, "an employee or agent of a nonprofit edu-
cational institution, library or archives" has the benefit of remittitur,
but only when he or she has infringed by reproducing the plain-
tiff's work while acting within the scope of employment.20 3 Second,
"a public broadcasting entity" or person acting "as a regular part of
the nonprofit activities of a public broadcasting entity" can obtain
remittitur of damages for infringement by performing or reproduc-
ing a transmission of "a published nondramatic literary work."2 4
No reported case has applied this provision of the Copyright Act to
remit statutory damages.05
199. See 17 U.S.C. § 401(d), § 402(d) (2006).
200. See Maverick Recording Co. v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193, 198-99 (5th Cir. 2010) (hold-
ing that § 402(d) "gives publishers the option to trade the extra burden of providing
copyright notice for absolute protection against the innocent infringer defense"); BMG
Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cit. 2005). The "extra burden" described by the
Maverick court is, of course, negligible.
201. See Alan E. Garfield, Calibrating Copyright Statutory Damages To Promote Speech, 38 FLA.
ST. L. REv. 1, 43-44 (2010) (identifying this problem and proposing an appropriate
amendment to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2)).
202. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2).
203. See id. § 504(c) (2) (i).
204. See id. § 504(c) (2) (ii).
205. The statutory remittitur provisions are so narrow in scope that litigants rarely invoke
them in infringement cases. On the few occasions when they have, courts have declined
defendants' requests to remit statutory damages. See Bosch v. Ball-Kell, Civ. No. 03-1408,
2006 WL 2548053 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2006); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758
F. Supp. 1522, 1545-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting a print shop's bid for statutory remittitur,
which was predicated on an argument that the print shop was an "agent" of a higher educa-
tion institution).
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Finally, the infringement action calls for the plaintiff to prove, by
evidence direct or circumstantial, that the defendant "actually cop-
ied" his or her work.206  Although inadvertent and even
unconscious 27 copying is actionable, the law allows that an "inde-
pendently created" work, however similar it might be to
copyrighted content, is not infringing.20 The actual copying ele-
ment protects the defendant against a situation in which he or she
renders expression without any awareness that the plaintiff had
done so first. It is of no use to the defendant who acted in good
faith but strayed into the infringement zone for other reasons.
Thus, although copyright is not insensitive to the concept of the
good faith or innocent infringer, the sensitivity it does show is re-
flected in an odd patchwork of very limited exceptions to the
general rule of strict infringement liability. These indulgences
ought to be unsatisfying to a court looking for a scienter require-
ment to rebuff a constitutional vagueness challenge.
III. VAGUENESS REVIEW AS A PATHWAY TO COPYRIGHT REFORM
If we accept that the Copyright Act and its supporting common
law doctrines and judicial interpretations (1) do not provide ade-
quate notice to speakers, (2) may often chill speech, and (3) are at
least "colloquially vague," then the next question is, of course, what
should be done about it. Section A of this Part argues that courts
are not likely to invalidate the Copyright Act for vagueness. Nor is
this necessarily an attractive or constructive result. Moreover,
Section B explains that there is little that lawmakers can do to cure
the notice failure that inheres in the copyright infringement
action, generally, or for that matter in the rescue doctrines that
resolve copyright's First Amendment overbreadth problem.
206. See, e.g., Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 63 (2d
Cir. 2010); Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ASP Consulting LLC, 560 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir 2009)
(citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)); see also supra
note 132 (discussing the "access + substantial similarity" avenue to proof of actual copying by
circumstantial evidence).
207. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1983)
(affirming a liability finding against the defendant songwriter et al., notwithstanding a claim
that the infringing song's substantial similarity to a preexisting work was "subconscious")
(citing, inter alia, 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.08 (1983) ("Innocent
intent should no more constitute a defense in an infringement action than in the case of
conversion of tangible personalty.")).
208. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir. 1997)
("The Copyright Act forbids only copying; if independent creation results in an identical
work, the creator of that work is free to sell it."); Grubb v. KMS Patriots, L.P., 88 F.3d 1, 3
(1st Cir. 1996).
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All that said, the vagueness doctrine may nonetheless point the
way to meaningful reform of the copyright laws, particularly in
light of the collateral factors that courts routinely apply in the
course of their constitutional review. Although application of these
collateral factors to copyright law only amplifies the constitutional
concerns raised above, Section C shows that these factors also
suggest meaningful reforms that will reduce the consequences of
notice failure for speakers and thereby mitigate copyright's chilling
effects on lawful speech.
A. The Unlikely Prospect of Voiding Copyright Law for Vagueness
Invalidation of the Copyright Act, in whole or in part, is unlikely.
The one judge asked to consider the question, Judge Marilyn Patel
in Aharonian v. Gonzales,' declined to take it up. In Aharonian, the
pro se plaintiff petitioned the district court to excise computer code
from the corpus of content subject to protection under the Copy-
right Act.21 o Aharonian argued that § 102(b) of the Copyright Act,
which distinguishes copyrightable "expression" from "ideas," was
unconstitutionally vague as applied to software.21' Aharonian quot-
ed Judge Hand's observation that "the test for infringement ... is
of necessity vague,"1 and he argued that the copyright laws impli-
cate free expression and in some instances even criminalize
speech.213
Describing Aharonian's quotation of Judge Hand as "strange[ ,"
Judge Patel pronounced that "[t]he fact that the test is necessarily
somewhat vague does not mean that it is unconstitutionally so. "2 14
In support of that conclusion, Judge Patel relied on the proposi-
tion-often cited by courts when they sustain laws against a
void-for-vagueness challenge _-that all laws are to some extent
209. No. C 04-5190 MHP, 2006 WL 13067 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2006).
210. Seeid.at*l.
211. See id. at *6.
212. See id. at *7 (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487,
489 (2d Cir. 1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
213. See id. at *6-*7 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 506 (criminal liability); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 218-19 (2003) (reconciling copyright values to the First Amendment)).
214. Id. at *7.
215. Courts rejecting constitutional vagueness challenges commonly recite that "we can
never expect mathematical certainty from our language." E.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.
703, 733 (2000) (statute prohibiting solicitations outside health care clinics); Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989) (use regulations for municipal band shell);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (municipal anti-noise ordinance); see
also City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 112 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting the
language in support of an anti-loitering ordinance).
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vague. 'Judge Patel wrote that uncertainty in the law "is a bedrock
assumption of our common law system."1 Of course, all laws do
carry some inherent vagueness, and the Constitution must and
does admit the possibility of "a certain degree" of after-the-fact ju-
dicial interpretation.2 " The question is whether, in light of the fact
that copyright burdens free expression-a fact that considerably
narrows the ability of lawmakers to cede application and interpre-
tation to post hoc litigation""-the amount of post hoc interpretation
it admits goes beyond that "certain degree."220 Without any real dis-
cussion of why, Judge Patel wrote that it does not.
Judge Patel did write in support of copyright, that it "works in
tandem with the First Amendment to further free expression."22 If
we accept that copyright serves as an "engine of free expression"
even as it restricts free expression, then the applicability of the
"constitutionally-protected right" collateral factor is surely reduced,
because even though the infringement action might chill or penal-
ize the speech, the grant of proprietary rights does the
countervailing work of promoting speech. This fact may allow a
court to tolerate a greater degree of ex ante uncertainty in its
vagueness review than it otherwise might. This assumes, however,
that the court is in a position to apply a meaningful vagueness
standard to a "somewhat" vague law in the first place. It assumes
that higher courts have supplied the sort of guidance that will allow
lower courts to reach a principled answer. In this respect, Judge
Patel cannot be faulted for simply deciding the case without offer-
ing doctrinally satisfying review under the void-for-vagueness
doctrine. To be sure, the Supreme Court cannot be faulted for hav-
ing fashioned the doctrine in a way that, collateral factors aside,
cannot give substantial advance guidance regarding at what point
"somewhat vague" becomes too vague. Crafting a test of this sort
for application to unanticipated, down-the-line laws is as difficult as
determining ex ante the point at which "similar" works become "sub-
224stantially similar," and for the same reasons. As with any doctrine
216. See Aharonian, 2006 WL 13067, at *6 ("Language is unavoidably inexact . ).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See supra Section I.D.1. It is noteworthy that the several examples of "necessarily
broad" terms thatJudge Patel invoked in support of allowing post hoc interpretation-"due
process of law," "obvious," and "restraint of trade," Aharonian, 2006 IL 13067, at *6 (citing
U.S. CONST. amend. V, 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (patents); 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Sherman Act), respec-
tively), do not generally have applications that will chill expression.
220. Aharonian, 2006 HL 13067, at *6.
221. Id. at *7.
222. See Harper & Row, Publ'rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
223. See Aharonian, 2006 WL 13067, at *7.
224. See supra Section II.C. .
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of jurisprudence, legal standards and precedent take a judge only
so far. The vagueness doctrine is remarkable only for the sheer
amount of discretion left to a judge after he or she steps out from
the cover of prior judicial amplification of the legal standard.
Of course, these truths about the vagueness doctrine only ex-
plain why Judge Patel's decision is not satisfying as ajurisprudential
matter. Why she ruled as she did bears further discussion. First,
Aharonian did not present a compelling constitutional case. The
conduct Aharonian described in his declaratory judgment com-
plaint, "the wholesale copying of source code," fell amply within
the zone of conduct any reasonable person would regard as in-
fringing.1" More importantly, the conduct alleged by Aharonian
was not expressive in nature. In short, Aharonian sought to mount
a facial vagueness challenge on the question of copyright's applica-
tion to a species of non-expressive conduct. 6
Second, vague as they may be, the copyright laws have consider-
able historical momentum behind them. Courts have been aware
of, and have tolerated, copyright's notice defects for decades.
Although the declaration Aharonian sought, that the court rule
copyright vague and therefore invalid as applied to software code,
was relatively narrow in scope, the logic he deployed was no less
applicable to the several other subjects of copyright. If Judge Patel
had accepted Aharonian's vagueness argument, there would be no
basis to distinguish a more general vagueness challenge to copy-
right. Holding any provision of copyright law void for vagueness
would be a grand, disruptive step with significant consequences for
the content industries constructed on the current copyright
framework. A court would not take such a step without good rea-
son, and Aharonian, for his part, did not supply one.
Even assuming a set of facts more friendly to a constitutional
challenge-say, a defendant's documented good-faith reliance on a
fair use defense against infringement claims brought by a plaintiff
whose apparent motive in suing was to suppress the defendant's
225. See Aharonian, 2006 WL 13067, at *7 ("While it may be that certain prohibitions by
the copyright laws are in tension with the First Amendment, the conduct alleged by plain-
tiff-the wholesale copying of source code-lies at the core of what copyright law seeks to
protect. Thus there is no problem of vagueness or lack of notice in this case.").
226. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 &
n.6 (2008) (observing that outside the context of the First Amendment, a facial challenge
will not succeed unless the law is unconstitutional in all its applications); Vill. of Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982) (requiring a facial chal-
lenge brought on vagueness grounds to establish that the law is "impermissibly vague in all
of its applications").
227. See, e.g., Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 63 (2d
Cir. 2010); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960);
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
390 [VOL. 45:2
Copyright and the Vagueness Doctfine
political speech-it is unlikely that any court would rule differently
than Judge Patel. A judge taking due consideration of the politics
that attend the question of copyright's constitutionality will be in-
clined to rule conservatively,18 and the case law will provide all the
cover he or she needs to reject a vagueness challenge. The Su-
preme Court adhered to this very paradigm in Eldred ," wherein
the Court declined to engage in any serious review of the plaintiffs
argument of overbreadth.so
Courts will surely be reluctant to invalidate all, or even some, of
the Copyright Act's vague prescriptions. Given that invalidation
would be an extreme and not very constructive (but surely eye-
catching) gesture at solving the vagueness problem, such reluctance
is understandable. Accordingly, this Article proposes instead to ex-
amine the possibility of reform.
B. The Incurability of Copyight's Notice Failure
The most obvious and straightforward approach to correcting
copyright's vagueness problem would be to write more and better
definition into the law, and yet it is difficult to see how copyright
law could provide more notice to speakers than it does. The copy-
right infringement action cannot be simplified without eliminating
many of the law's top-level, potentially dispositive doctrines.
Work-for-hire, originality, copyright duration, the registration re-
quirement, and the several use privileges reserved to the public in
§§ 108-110 are all instrumental to the copyright scheme. To mark
any or all of them for deletion would sacrifice important policy
values and make copyright only marginally less vague.
Likewise, little constructive work can be done to ameliorate the
inherent vagueness of the rescue doctrines, substantial similarity
and fair use. Judge Hand did observe, after all, that the "test for
infringement" was "of necessity vague.,2 1 As this Article notes, efforts
to impose some definition and predictability upon substantial
228. Cf Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 534
(2004) (arguing that "political considerations" have inclined Congress and the courts to tip
copyright's balance of private rights and public privileges decidedly toward rightsholders
(citing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY lAw ch. 15 (2003))).
229. Id. at 536 (arguing from the "result in Eldred" that courts are unlikely to address
"the increasing detachment of U.S. copyright law from its constitutional underpinnings").
230. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003). One commentator has de-
scribed the Eldred Court's ruling as "very conservative," "accommodationist," and
"insufficiently critical." Steven J. Horowitz, A Free Speech Theory of Copyright, 2009 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 2, 9, 22, 24 n.69.
231. PeterPanFabrics, 274 F.2d at 489 (emphasis added).
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similarity have been self-defeating. The cause of this should be ob-
vious: the substantial similarity test is written generally to apply to
every claim of infringement of every copyrighted work; thus, the
range of the rule's applications is so broad that one must step back
to an extreme level of abstraction to capture it all. From that
panoramic point of abstraction, little can be said to elaborate sub-
stantial similarity other than the bland generalities deferring the
question to an ordinary observer's gut feel. In truth, the only effec-
tive way to resolve substantial similarity's vagueness would be to
abandon the doctrine outright in favor of a bright-line rule confin-
ing the infringement action to instances in which the defendant
exactly copied the plaintiff's protected work. This approach begs
an important question: how can copyright law handle the hypo-
thetical case Judge Hand proposed in Nichols, wherein a "plagiarist"
seeks to "escape" liability by introducing "immaterial variations?"2 1
Courts have interposed the possibility of proof by substantial simi-
larity precisely to address the concern that infringers might game
the system in this way.14 A requirement that the defendant have
rendered a literal, perfect copy of a work would accomplish a radi-
cal reorientation of proprietary rights and public privileges, again
exchanging longstanding policy values to address just one of copy-
right's several pockets of vagueness.
An attempt to bring greater definition to fair use would not be
constructive, either, in the respect that it would only trade a vague-
ness problem for overbreadth. Viewed from one perspective, fair
use's vagueness is speech-supportive. Rather than settle into law an
array of specific approved uses of copyrighted content, as most for-
232. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 746
(2009) (affirming Judge Hand's intuition that substantial similarity "cannot rely much on
previous case law" because the test "is fact- and context-driven"); Daniel Fox, Harsh Realities:
Substantial Similarity in the Reality Television Context, 13 UCIA ENT. L. REV. 223, 227-28 (2006)
("In this respect, copyright infringement cases are unique, for it is impossible to say how
much taking is too much without reference to the specific works at issue.").
233. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
234. See, e.g., id.; 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 117, § 13.03; see also Bateman v.
Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1543 n.25 (11th Cir. 1996); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986).
235. Theoretically, a court might extend an infringement claim to the plaintiff who
shows only de minimis differences and can prove that the variations were introduced simply
to provide a litigation buffer between the two works. But this model is Nichols all over again.
The mere fact that a defendant sought to construct such a buffer against infringement
should not be enough to incur liability, without a further showing that the defendant other-
wise misappropriated the plaintiffs work. Absent recourse to a standard for liability that
turns on the defendant's intentions as to the plaintiffs work-and this is not featured in the
civil infringement action, as presently configured, see supra Section II.D.3-we can only
draw our conclusions about misappropriation based on the extent of similarity between the
works in question.
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eign jurisdictions have done,2 3 1 U.S. law accepts the possibility that
the public might identify reasonable uses of copyrighted content
that lawmakers have not contemplated and approved.3 Of course,
the flipside of this open-endedness is vagueness. We do not know
which unanticipated uses are fair until a court has ratified them.
As to uses that the law clearly does contemplate, such as "criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching. . . scholarship, or research," 2 3
the nature and extent of the use passable as fair is necessarily
context-dependent.2 0 It is not surprising that efforts to generate
extrajudicial guidelines in these contemplated areas have seen only
limited success. Guidelines may ultimately not prove serviceable
because of their failure to obtain buy-in from both publishers and
users,2 4' and, more significantly, because the very concept of
specific guidance is irreconcilable with the law's formative presen-
,,242
tation of fair use as an "equitable rule of reason.
This is not to suggest that more cannot be done to bring clarity
to the fair use defense. Efforts by commentators to systematize the
doctrine from the jumble of cases in the Federal Reporters allow us
to distill principles from the precedent and extrapolate from
236. See Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REv. 797, 872 (2010) (citing
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 293-94
(2001)).
237. Cf Joseph P. Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use?, 31 COLUM.J.L. & ARTS 571, 572 (2008) (de-
scribing the doctrine's "open-ended and flexible texture" and its "ability to capture a wide
range of considerations" as "its great strength").
238. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L.
REv. 1569, 1620 (2009) ("[Flair use effectively circumscribes the grant [of proprietary
rights] ex post.").
239. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
240. See Frank Pasquale, Copyright in an Era of Information Overload: Toward the Privileging
of Categorizers, 60 VAND. L. REV. 135, 153 n.78 (2007) ("The fair use test codified in 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 is more a standard than a rule, left deliberately open-ended in order to permit contex-
tual judgment to trump mechanical pigeonholing of cases."); Balganesh, supra note 238, at
1616-17 ("Incentives tend to vary from one inventor or creator to another or one area of
application to another, necessitating significant contextual fine-tuning.").
241. See, e.g., BRUCE A. LEHMAN, THE CONFERENCE ON FAIR USE: FINAL REPORT TO THE
COMMISSIONER ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON FAIR USE (1998) (setting forth
the findings of a joint undertaking by publisher and user constituencies to devise agreed
guidelines for educational fair use of published content-and describing several areas in
which the parties failed to reach agreement); see also jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use,
51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 395, 423 (2009) (describing unilateral efforts by librarians and
documentary filmmakers to articulate fair use guidelines, without publishers' input).
242. See Harper & Row Publ'rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); see also
Mazzone, supra note 241, at 424 (citing Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom
in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REv. 1899, 1920 (2007); Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair
Use and the Illusion ofFair-Use Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 665 (2001)).
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them. And of course, the law designates certain uses of content as
per se reasonable and defensible.2 4 1 It is important to note, however,
that these per se privileged uses are not themselves denominated as
"fair." Thus, although they offer the relief of the bright-line rule
and express something about Congress's intention to balance pro-
prietary rights and public privileges, they ultimately do little to
inform us about the fair use defense in particular." Finally, Con-
gress could always go the further step of codifying certain core uses
it deems fair and reasonable.2 Notwithstanding these opportuni-
ties, whatever commentators and Congress do to describe a
heartland of fair use values, an open-ended fair use defense will
remain indeterminate at the margins.
In short, copyright law accepts as a fundamental premise, in a
way that other category-based content regulations do not, that its
restrictions will be applied flexibly, on a case-by-case basis, and with
due attendance to circumstances.2 Introducing bright-line rules to
supply greater advance notice to speakers would subvert many of
copyright's objectives.
C. Copyright's Answer to a Vagueness Challenge: A Three-Tiered
Remedies Model Keyed to Level ofFault
Based on the analysis set forth above, we can draw the following
conclusions about the copyright infringement action, with respect
to the void-for vagueness doctrine: (1) copyright infringement
claims are fraught with complexity and uncertainty, even (and
243. See generally WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE (2010) (canvassing the fair use
case law); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2537 (2009)
(same).
244. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 108-12.
245. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108(f) (2006) (limited preservation and distribution rights of
libraries and archives) ("Nothing in this section . .. in any way affects the right of fair use as
provided by section 107 . . . .").
246. See David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REv. 139, 175-76
(2009); cf 'William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REv. 2267,
2302-17 (2010) (proposing categorical bright-line principles as a first recourse to defend-
ants seeking to raise fair use defenses in trademark cases, toward the end of alleviating the
infringement action's chilling effect on speech).
247. See Balganesh, supra note 238, at 1616-17 (suggesting that the "innumerable vague
standards" of copyright are "largely beneficial," because "[s]tandards enable courts to cali-
brate the scope of the entitlement to its underlying purpose and function"); McJohn, supra
note 139, at 347 (arguing that the "very vagueness of the test" for infringement allows courts
to write law that "balances a number of competing policies").
248. To be sure, there are areas of copyright law in which some greater clarity could be
more easily achieved. Most notably, lawmakers could write reform provisions that settle what
works are in the public domain.
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arguably, especially) in the aspects of law that are said to salvage
copyright from challenges of First Amendment overbreadth; (2)
copyright regulates expression; (3) the civil infringement claimm is
quasi-criminal in nature; and (4) defendants do not have the bene-
fit of a scienter buffer to insulate them from civil liability when they
act in good faith. It is clear that something has to give. Given that
little can be done to alleviate conclusions (1) and (2), lawmakers
may best address copyright's vagueness problem by turning their
attention to the quasi-criminal statutory damages and the lack of a
scienter requirement for infringement.
Accordingly, this Article proposes that copyright law adopt a
three-tiered remedy structure for cases in which the subject is the
defendant's expression, leaving the current remedy structure in
place for all other infringement suits. The law would differentiate
between cases brought against pure non-expressive conduct-such
as reproduction of software, trafficking in counterfeited works, or
the wholesale copying of entertainment works purely for consump-
tive purposes-and cases in which the allegedly infringing conduct
carries some quantum, however small, of the defendant's own ex-
pression. Concededly, bifurcating remedial schemes around the
question of expression/non-expression creates an additional op-
portunity for litigation in an already complicated area of law. Yet
from a vagueness perspective, such a model would be a net gain, as
the reformed law would mitigate the effects of copyright's inde-
terminacy where they are most consequential: that is, where they
burden speech rather than "purely economic" activity.2so
The remedies structure proposed here for infringement claims
brought against a defendant's expression is as follows: first, strict
liability would remain the standard for obtaining injunctive relief;
second, a plaintiff would have to establish some amount of culpa-
bility, likely negligence, to recover any damages in an infringement
action; and third, a plaintiff would not be able to elect statutory
damages without first showing willfulness.
1. Strict Liability for Injunctive Relief
The Copyright Act authorizes a court to "grant temporary and fi-
nal injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent
249. As I have noted, copyright's criminal provisions are enforceable only against willful
infringers, see 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2006), and so likely do not offend
due process. See cases cited supra note 65.
250. See e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 & n.10 (1974).
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or restrain infringement of a copyright."2 51 Such relief, in and of
itself, is not a matter of concern from the standpoint of the vague-
ness doctrine. In an injunction case, the defendant who has strayed
by accident into the enforcement zone will encounter only an in-
struction from the court to take appropriate steps to cease and
desist from the infringing conduct. So long as the injunction itself
is not vague,"' the legal risk that copyright's uncertainty shifts onto
speakers has negligible vagueness doctrine significance. The in-
junction does not deprive the defendant of a liberty interest he or
she otherwise had, nor does he or she forfeit property because of
the law's vagueness.
Put another way, an injunction is not remotely the sort of crimi-
nal or quasi-criminal remedy that commands the closest vagueness
scrutiny, nor is it as consequential, for purposes of the vagueness
doctrine, as a civil claim for actual damages.5 The constitutionally
offensive "hallmarks" of a vague law, as discussed above,5 do not
adhere where the remedy for a violation is a go-no-further injunc-
tion. There is no notice failure, and the law does not "trap the
innocent for not providing fair warning,""6 because an injunction
both supplies the notice and accomplishes the warning. Nor can
the prospect of an injunction, standing alone, be said to have a
chilling effect on speech, as the court's entry of the injunction
supplies a defendant with a final opportunity to turn back before
251. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006).
252. See, e.g., 3M v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587, 597 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 65(d)'s requirement that "[e]very order granting an injunction ... shall set
forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable
detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to
be restrained"); Metro. Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Local 100, Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int'l Un-
ion, 239 F.3d 172, 178-79 (2d Cir. 2001) (dissolving a preliminary injunction on vagueness
grounds).
253. To be sure, a defendant may incur reliance costs by guessing wrong-for example,
by sinking costs into the print edition of a work that is subsequently enjoined. But these
costs are circumstantial and attenuated by at least one remove from the actual remedy,
which cannot be said in and of itself to deprive the defendant of a property interest.
254. I do not mean to understate the dangers that injunctions pose to free speech; in-
deed, the Supreme Court has suggested that a prior restraint may offend First Amendment
values more than the threat of criminal prosecution-or prosecution itself. See New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (holding that the government could not
invoke the espionage laws to effect a prior restraint on publication of the Pentagon Papers,
while concurring justices suggested that post-publication prosecution of the Times remained
a viable option for the government). And one can easily imagine instances in which a copy-
right infringement plaintiff obtains an injunction to achieve a censorious purpose. But in
cases like these, the injunctions are objectionable for reasons other than that they issued
under a vague law, and recourse to the vagueness doctrine is not the appropriate means for
addressing the implications for speech.
255. See supra Part I.A.
256. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); see also City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58 (1998).
Copyright and the Vagueness Doctrine
he or she incurs any real penalty. At least where the remedy is ex-
clusively injunctive relief, the defendant is eligible for a "mulligan."
That said, a vague law that authorizes injunctive relief arguably
does delegate an excess of authority to judges, who are given sub-
stantial latitude to create case-specific law.' 7 For their part,
however, judges tend to think rather highly of their colleagues' ca-
258pacity to act appropriately, when given broad discretion.
2. Fault Requirement/Negligence for Actual Damages
When a plaintiff seeks compensation for damages as a result of
infringement, he or she should be required to show that the de-
fendant acted at least negligently with regard to the plaintiffs
proprietary rights. Such an approach would have the virtue of in-
troducing free speech protections equivalent to what the Supreme
Court fashioned for defendants in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan'5
and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,26 0 its landmark cases on defamation
and the First Amendment.261 After all, among regulations of expres-
sive content, the copyright infringement action is most similar in
nature to a defamation action: both laws are enforced civilly by pri-
vate litigants to vindicate injured private interests. Yet, in marked
contrast to copyright's tradition of strict liability, defamation liability
does not adhere unless the plaintiff can prove some measure of
fault on the part of the defendant in uttering his or her false
statement.262
257. Cf Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 316 (1967) (expressing vagueness
concerns about a municipal ordinance, based on which the city obtained an injunction
against demonstrations).
258. See, e.g., Walker, 388 U.S. at 319 (rejecting petitioners' attempts to overturn crimi-
nal contempt findings for violating the injunction, in part on the ground that the injunction
issued ex parte, and "if the court had been presented with the petitioners' contentons, it
might well have dissolved or at least modified its order in some respects"); see also supra note
23.
259. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
260. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
261. Compare Buck v.Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1931) ("Intention
to infringe is not essential under the [Copyright] Act."), with, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347
(holding that state tort law provisions for defamation may "not impose liability without
fault").
262. The extent of fault required of course varies based on whether the plaintiff is a
public figure. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that
the First Amendment requires a defamation plaintiff who is a public figure to prove "actual
malice," i.e., that the defendant uttered a false statement "with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not"); see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 (allow-
ing the several states to specify their own levels of fault for defamation of nonpublic figures,
provided that, at a minimum, they require a showing of negligence).
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To be sure, the Sullivan and Gertz Courts did not specifically ref-
erence the vagueness doctrine in announcing their fault
requirements, as, strictly speaking, defamation's uncertainty prob-
lem does not inhere in the elements of the tort. The elements draw
the line between protected and prohibited conduct adequately
enough; rather, defamation liability raises constitutional concerns
because it positions a speaker to stray into the zone of liability
based on a mistake of fact as to whether a statement is true.' The
overarching concern, however, is the same as in copyright: the def-
amation action admits the sort of uncertainty that, if strict liability
264applies, will chill free expression. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court ruled in Gertz that strict defamation liability, even for com-
pensatory damages, offends the First Amendment.1" In the case of
copyright, where uncertainty is more substantial, is more pervasive,
and infects the law's very definition of what is and is not lawful
speech, one would expect the Supreme Court's defamation logic to
* *266apply a fortiori.
The Gertz fault requirement is generally read to require, at a
minimum, proof of negligence as to the truth of the defendant's
statement about the plaintiff,267 so it falls well short of willfulness or
scienter on the continuum of culpability. How the ordinary "duty
and breach" tort law construction of negligence might apply to the
truth element of a defamation claim is not immediately obvious,
but the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests two alternative
formulations of the test:
263. In this respect, the falsity element of defamation poses the same problem as the
question whether a given work is in the public domain. See supra text accompanying notes
119-124.
264. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340-41 ("Our decisions recognize that a rule of strict lia-
bility that compels a publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual
assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship.").
265. See id.
266. Again, see supra text accompanying notes 128 and 129. One could argue that defa-
mation law's concessions to the First Amendment mean principally to protect high-value
speech of public interest, whereas the Supreme Court has downgraded the First Amend-
ment value of using "other people's speeches." See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191
(2003). However, the apt analogy to draw between defamation and copyright infringement
is not between speech of public interest and other people's speeches-it is between false-
hood and other people's speeches, either of which may involve matters of public interest.
Compare Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340-41 ("[A]lthough the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy
of constitutional protection, . .. [t]he First Amendment requires that we protect some false-
hood in order to protect speech that matters."), with Eldred, 537 U.S. at 191.
267. See, e.g., 2 DAN B. DOBBs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 491, at 1179 (West Group 2001)
("The states have overwhelmingly adopted negligence as the standard of fault to be required
where a private person sues."); see also, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomim. Consortium, Inc.
v. Fed. Comm. Comm'n, 518 U.S. 727, 741 (1996) (describing the Gertz holding as "allowing
greater regulation of speech harming individuals who are not public officials, but still re-
quiring a negligence standard").
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Insofar as the truth or falsity of the defamatory statement is
concerned, the question of negligence has sometimes been
expressed in terms of the defendant's state of mind by asking
whether he had reasonable grounds for believing that the
communication was true. Putting the question in terms of
conduct is to ask whether the defendant acted reasonably in
checking on the truth or falsity or defamatory character of the
communication before publishing it.268
Under the "state of mind" model of negligence, a plaintiff in a
copyright case could obtain actual damages only by showing that
the defendant lacked reasonable grounds for concluding that his
or her expression was non-infringing.269 The latter, "conduct"-based
form of negligence inquiry would have damages liability turn on
whether the defendant "acted reasonably" in adjudging whether he
or she infringed.270
3. Willfulness Requirement for Statutory Damages
Finally, awards of statutory damages should be confined to cases
in which a plaintiff has shown willfulness. The reason for this is
straightforward: it is in (1) the award of extra-compensatory dam-
ages, (2) against instances of defendant expression, (3) without a
scienter requirement, that copyright's vagueness is most constitu-
tionally problematic. All three of the collateral factors point to a
constitutional violation. The protections owed to defendants in
civil infringement suits, brought against expressive conduct for
statutory damages made available on a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard of proof, must therefore be significant. The
concept of willfulness, already integrated into copyright as the
state-of-mind predicate for criminal penalties and increased statuto-
271ry damages, is not alien or inapposite to the infringement action.
268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, cmt. g ("The negligence standard").
269. Cf., e.g., Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of Eastern Pa., 923 A.2d 389,
397 (Pa. 2007) (endorsing a negligence test for defamation claims by which the plaintiff
must show the defendant had "no reasonable grounds to believe the defamatory matter was
true"); Winn v. United Press Int'l, 938 F. Supp. 39, 43 (D.D.C. 1996) ("lacked reasonable
grounds for such belief") (applying Virginia law).
270. Cf Winn, 938 F. Supp. at 39, 43, 44-46 (holding that the defendant did not act un-
reasonably in republishing an untrue statement from a reputable source that was not, on its
face, improbable).
271. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(c) (2), 506 (2006); R.W. Beck, Inc. v. E3 Consulting, LLC, 577
F.3d 1133, 1148 (10th Cir. 2009).
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Courts would simply apply it more broadly in actions for statutory
damages.
A willfulness requirement for statutory damages is more difficult
to reconcile with defamation law, copyright's publication tort ana-
logue. The Gertz Court did hold that, in defamation cases, a court
cannot constitutionally presume damages (as the plaintiffs right to
elect statutory damages allows) or award punitive damages (as stat-
utory damages typically are, when elected) absent a showing of
actual malice; that is actual knowledge of untruth or reckless disre-
gard for truth.7  Given this holding, a willfulness requirement for
statutory damages-the primary purposes of which are to punish
and deter infringement and to spare the plaintiff the difficulty of
proving actual damages -seems even more appropriate in the
copyright setting. However, a subsequent Supreme Court decision,
214
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., narrowed the
Gertz holding, ruling that in cases not involving matters of public
concern, an award of presumed or punitive damages does not re-
quire proof of actual malice.
Dun & Bradstreet's defamation ruling notwithstanding, a willful-
ness requirement for statutory damages is more consistent with
vagueness doctrine values, which command that greater protec-
tions be given to defendants as the consequences of violating the
law grow more severe, and specifically, as they cross over from civil
to quasi-criminal and criminal. Lawmakers could choose to bring
copyright in line with the Supreme Court's public/private treat-
ment of defamation in Dun & Bradstreet and Gertz, by requiring a
showing of willful infringement when the content of the defend-
ant's expression involves a matter of public concern and accepting
simple negligence otherwise. Of course, to achieve complete con-
gruence with defamation law, one would be required to take
account of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan2 '6 and set down a willful-
ness standard for any damages in infringement suits targeting
expression of public concern. The result of this parsing would be
that a showing of willfulness would be required in order to obtain
272. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 183, 184 (punish and deter); 2 WILLIAM F.
PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 1170 (1994) ("Since actual damages and profits
frequently are difficult to prove, the Copyright Act provides for minimum and maximum
statutory damages.").
274. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
275. Three justices so held in a plurality opinion, see id. at 761, and two others wrote
separate decisions suggesting that they would have overruled Gertz outright, see id. at 764
(Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 774 (White, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
276. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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actual or statutory damages in public concern cases, whereas negli-
gence would supply a sufficient predicate for damages of either
sort in all others. The law would draw no principled distinction
between cases warranting statutory damages and those for which
actual damages are adequate, a result that would nullify the effect
of the vagueness doctrine's "criminal/quasi-criminal remedies" col-
lateral factor. Thus, it would seem most consistent with the
vagueness doctrine, and at the same time would introduce less con-
fusion and disruption into the civil action for infringement, to
abandon outright the defamation cases' public/private distinction
and instead require willfulness for statutory damages and negli-
gence for actual damages in the copyright context.
D. The Rightsholder's Complaint
A rightsholder might protest that the reform proposed above
abrogates the longstanding principle that intention is irrelevant to
infringement,2m and that, in contrast to review of criminal laws (or
civil regulations), the cost of steps taken to resolve the vagueness of
a civil claim is borne by private parties-in this case, the
rightsholders who find their grants of exclusivity diluted and de-
valued 2 7 ' After all, whatever an infringer intended, his or her acts
are undertaken in derogation of a property right that often (if not
always) causes economic losses to the rightsholder. In the reform
model set forth above, however, strict liability would still adhere if
the plaintiff would be satisfied with an injunction. Accordingly, the
introduction of state-of-mind requirements for compensatory and
punitive damages does not require a rightsholder to endure the
consequences of ongoing expression that innocently infringes his
or her rights. For that matter, given that the current remedies
structure would remain in place for instances of counterfeiting,
piracy, and consumptive infringement (among other forms of in-
fringing conduct in which defendants cannot claim an expressive
stake), rightsholders could tackle the conduct that is of greatest
commercial concern on the same terms as they do now.
Of course, reforms undertaken to protect defendant speakers
necessarily reduce the value of a plaintiff's copyright. In fact, it has
been suggested that the chilling effect of copyright's vague stand-
ards is attractive because it supplies a further creative motivation to
277. See Buck v.Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1931); Lexmark Int'l,
Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 537 (6th Cir. 2004); Repp v. Webber,
132 F.3d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1997).
278. SeeBalganesh, supra note 238, at 1617.
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authors "who need ex ante incentives in excess of [copyright's]
curtailed entitlement."2 '9 However, in the zero-sum game of private
rights versus public privileges, these benefits of legal uncertainty
accrue to creators at the expense of public expressive rights. While
it is true that copyright's incentive scheme has constitutional status
280just as free expression does, and that courts have embraced the
view that the grant of proprietary rights in fact promotes free ex-
pression,8 it does not follow that the public should absorb the
consequences of a vague law simply because vagueness might serve
to support the law's purpose. Indeterminacy will always serve to
amplify the restrictive effect of a speech regulation and thereby
advance that law's purposes. In copyright's case, the vast majority of
freely uttered speech is not "fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion,"8 and still less speech is commercially exploited. The result is
that copyright provides a rather limited service as "engine" of ex-
pression, and this service is likely overemphasized in the case law.
More importantly, the Constitution only empowers Congress to en-
act property-based schemes to "promote the Progress ... of the
Sciences;" the First Amendment commands that Congress refrain
from infringing the right of free speech.
CONCLUSION
This Article does not claim to supply a definitive answer to the
question whether copyright law is unconstitutionally vague. Given
the nature of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, there probably is no
definitive answer, other than that to which five or more agreeable
Supreme Court Justices subscribe and so extend the force of law.
Surely, though, a vagueness challenge to copyright holds a great
deal more constitutional substance than Judge Patel was willing to
recognize in the Aharonian case. Courts and commentators accept
that copyright's speech-protective doctrines, such as substantial
similarity and fair use, are vague by necessity. It seems fair to argue,
further, that copyright is so complicated and thickly thatched with
potentially dispositive legal issues as to raise vagueness questions
about the infringement action generally.
279. Id.
280. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
281. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publ'rs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
282. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
283. Compare U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have power... ."), with
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Whether or not copyright's vagueness problem lands it on the
wrong side of the Constitution, there is indeed a problem, it is con-
stitutional in nature, and the Supreme Court's teachings on the
vagueness doctrine point the way to worthwhile reforms. Conced-
edly, the Court's writings on vagueness qua vagueness have
historically been themselves vague. This probably cannot be
helped, and the same is largely true of copyright's vagueness:
vagueness persists in the law either because it advances another
First Amendment value (as with fair use), or because it has proven
to be an unshakeable side effect of core copyright policy (idea v.
expression, substantial similarity). The Court's vagueness cases do,
however, offer some concrete guidance in the form of the three
collateral factors: specifically, the void-for-vagueness doctrine looks
askance at laws that burden free speech, are criminal or
quasi-criminal, and do not admit a scienter requirement. The civil
copyright infringement action, in its current and longstanding
configuration, comes up wanting as to all three of these important
collateral factors.
If, as argued here, the vagueness itself is so ingrained in copy-
right that the law cannot be cured of it, it follows that lawmakers
should look to the collateral factors for ways to mitigate the
constitutional consequences of vagueness. A radical approach to
vindicating the vagueness doctrine would do away with copyright's
provision for statutory damages altogether and impose a strict re-
quirement that a plaintiff prove willful infringement to establish a
right to actual damages. Indeed, for all we know about how the col-
lateral factors interrelate with a given law's measure of uncertainty,
the vagueness doctrine might well require this result. This Article
proposes a more measured reform that does less violence to copy-
right's current balancing of private rights and public privileges and
instead incorporates, as applicable, the wisdom of the Supreme
Court's defamation jurisprudence. This approach, which would
retain strict liability for claims for injunctive relief while
requiring proof of negligence for actual damages and willfulness
for statutory damages, is more likely to appeal to lawmakers.
To date, the courts have deflected questions about copyright's
constitutionality with the assertion that copyright itself incorpo-
rates protections that reconcile the law's restrictions on speech
with the First Amendment. Even if we take the courts at their word,
the problem remains that these protections do next to nothing ex
ante to clarify what expression copyright protects. One cannot
know whether the three-tiered infringement action proposed here
is constitutionally necessary, or for that matter, whether it would be
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sufficient to save the civil infringement claim from the void-for-
vagueness doctrine. That said, it would surely be an improvement
on the existing scheme, which confronts a would-be speaker with
an impossible tangle of unsettled legal issues that directly pertain
to his or her right to engage in free speech. It is small consolation
that the law promises determinacy through costly and protracted
litigation, after which, if the speaker guesses right, he or she will
have avoided the levy of a self-consciously punitive award of statu-
tory damages.
